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ABSTRACT 
Rhetoric and Heresthetic in the Mississippi Freedom Party 
Controversy at the 1964 Democratic Convention. (August 2005) 
Adria Battaglia, B.A., Texas A&M University; 
M.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune 
 
This thesis shows the development and shifts in rhetorical form as strategies 
evolve to meet heresthetic demands. This thesis explores the rhetorical crisis that 
emerged between the Democratic Party and the Mississippi Freedom Party at the 1964 
Democratic Convention. Specifically, the focus is on the rhetorical discourse presented 
by the members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, Fannie Lou Hamer in 
particular, at the Credentials Committee two days before the onset of the actual 
Convention. It is the rhetorical interplay in the specific context of the Committee, the 
subsequent political bargaining behind the scenes during the next four days of the 
Convention, and the emerging and evolving constraints as a result of this bargaining that 
illuminate the symbolic power and limitations behind a rhetoric aimed at redefining race 











"History is the witness that testifies to the passing of time; it illuminates reality, vitalizes 
memory, provides guidance in daily life, and brings us tidings of antiquity." ~ Cicero 
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In the summer of 2004, American Heritage columnist Joshua Zeitz wrote an 
article entitled “Democratic Debacle,” in which he traced the party’s “loss of the South” 
and subsequent political problems back to the convention crisis of the Sixties.1 But Zeitz 
wasn’t referring to the well-known convention calamity in Chicago, 1968. In fact, he 
writes, 
[The] woes of the Democratic Party didn’t originate in Chicago, or even in 1968. 
They can be traced back to another convention, in another city, in another year. 
Forty years ago this summer, the Democratic Party met in Atlantic City to 
nominate the incumbent president, Lyndon Johnson, for another term. Nobody 
knew it then, but that 1964 Democratic National Convention would be a turning 
point for the party. It was Atlantic City that sowed the seeds of the internecine 
wars that tore apart the Democratic coalition four years later in Chicago and that 
have left it wounded ever since.2 
The 1964 Democratic National Convention provided the context for a rhetorical crisis. 
The residue of this crisis continues to permeate the party’s public and private image.  
 Yet this crisis involved more players than those within the party, for the 1964 
convention was the forum chosen by the organizations within the Civil Rights 
Movement to lobby their equal political representation plan to the party, the president  
__________ 




and the American public. The lobbyists came to Atlantic City as representatives of 
blacks in Mississippi (they held elections and were recognized within the black  
community, but were not considered legitimate by white politicians in the South). 
Known as the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, these representatives embodied 
the final chapter of Freedom Summer, a Civil Rights project designed to register blacks 
to vote in the South. The Freedom Party had been conceived as soon as volunteers and 
civil rights activists realized that any progress they made in voter registration was 
negated by absolutely no representation in the party. They could not have known that 
this rhetorical crisis would prove equally divisive for their Movement as it would for the 
Democratic Party. 
In this thesis, I explore the rhetorical crisis that emerged between the Democratic 
Party and the Mississippi Freedom Party at the 1964 Democratic Convention. 
Specifically, the focus is on the rhetorical discourse presented by the members of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, Fannie Lou Hamer in particular, at the 
Credentials Committee two days before the onset of the actual Convention. It is the 
rhetorical interplay in the specific context of the Committee, the subsequent political 
bargaining behind the scenes during the next four days of the Convention, and the 
emerging and evolving constraints as a result of this bargaining that illuminate the 
symbolic power and limitations behind a rhetoric aimed at redefining race in the nation’s 
social and political consciousness. 
 Because the term “rhetorical crisis” is used throughout this thesis, it seems worth 
pausing to define a “rhetorical crisis.” In this thesis, I interchange the term “rhetorical 
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crisis” with the term “rhetorical exigency.” Synonyms, crisis and exigency simply mean 
a situation marked by urgency; a state requiring immediate action. What is a rhetorical 
crisis or exigency? The works of both Parke G. Burgess and Lloyd F. Bitzer seek to 
answer this question, and offer definitions and concepts that are crucial to the rhetorical 
description of this thesis.  
The idea of crisis rhetoric was developed by Burgess in his article, “Crisis 
Rhetoric: Coercion vs. Force.”3 Using a frog-pond parable, Burgess explores the 
possible modes of rhetoric that people choose from to deal with a crisis, and sets up his 
definition of crisis rhetoric. In the parable, a frog sits on a rock in the middle of a pond. 
A boy standing on the edge of the pond begins to throw rocks at the frog in an effort to 
kill it. Burgess explains that both the frog and the boy face a crisis because their physical 
and symbolic space is now complicated. The physical space, obviously, is composed of 
the physical characteristics in this particular situation. So, the distance between the frog 
and boy, the depth and temperature of the pond, the strength and endurance to move and 
survive (or kill) all make up the physical space. The symbolic space exists for the boy 
only. Burgess notes that “the boy cannot persuade or coerce the frog, as such symbolic 
action would fall on deaf frog-ears,” but that the boy can morally decide and then 
mentally calculate his strategy to kill the frog. “The scene becomes what it was not 
before,” writes Burgess, “because of personal power to fill symbolic space with a 
conceived world of decision and action.” This becomes his foundation for his definition 
of crisis rhetoric. 
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According to Burgess, “As crisis pervades the people-pond of a society deeply 
divided by change and increasingly cognizant of new privileges, the shallow and tranquil 
waters of conventional persuasion seem no more equipped to resolve it than a violent 
dive into the center of the pond. Consequently, persuasion can soon merge into 
coercion.” When conflict arises, people strategize about how to act and move—like the 
frog and the boy. Crisis rhetoric, then, can consist of persuasion—rhetoric that seeks to 
alter its audience’s thoughts, values or beliefs, coercion—persuasion that elicits a threat 
of force rather than actual force, or force—physical action versus an appeal to symbolic 
space, like the boy who throws a rock at the frog.  
Burgess’s parable is useful in understanding crisis rhetoric, but particularly 
important to this thesis is Bitzer’s identification of a rhetorical situation. Not only does 
this concept of a rhetorical situation offer a definition of a rhetorical exigence, but it sets 
up several other key concepts to the rhetorical description presented in this thesis. In his 
article, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Bitzer establishes the components of a rhetorical 
situation, and in so doing, defines rhetorical exigency. Bitzer explains that rhetorical 
situations are marked by three elements—a controlling exigence, an audience and a set 
of constraints. The first component, the “controlling exigence,” presents Bitzer’s 
definition of a rhetorical exigence. Expanding upon the basic definition of exigency and 
crisis, he writes, 
Any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, 
something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be. In almost 
any sort of context, there will be numerous exigencies, but not all are elements of 
5 
a rhetorical situation—not all are rhetorical exigencies. An exigence which 
cannot be modified is not rhetorical; thus, whatever comes about of necessity and 
cannot be changed—death, winter, and some natural disasters, for instance—are 
exigencies to be sure, but they are not rhetorical. . . An exigence is rhetorical 
when it is capable of positive modification and when positive modification 
requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse.4 
In other words, a rhetorical exigency emerges when there is some “specific condition,” 
“an imperfection marked by urgency,” that elicits utterance.5  
The controlling exigence introduces the second component of a rhetorical 
situation, and elaborates on the definition of a rhetorical exigency. The controlling 
exigency dictates what the main problem is—why an utterance is needed—and what 
audience shall be addressed in regards to this problem.6 The second element is the 
audience. More specifically, the audience composed of “only those persons who are 
capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change.”  
The third and final element of a rhetorical situation is a set of constraints. Constraints, 
Bitzer notes, are “persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation 
because they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the 
exigence.”7 Bitzer adds that once the orator engages in the rhetorical situation, “both he 
and his speech are additional constituents.”8 These concepts and definitions laid forth by 
Bitzer and Burgess offer a foundation on which this thesis builds. 
The 1964 Democratic Convention provides an ideal case study for exploring how 
each of the elements of a rhetorical situation—the controlling exigence, the audience and 
6 
the set of constraints—can empower and constrain rhetorical strategies. Hence this thesis 
offers a reconstruction of this particular rhetorical situation by exploring the rhetorical 
interplay of a social movement and the political, legal and social spheres that the 
movement seeks to change. In his essay, “Defining Movements Rhetorically: Casting the 
Widest Net,” Malcolm O. Sillars notes that “the environment in which a message is 
given, including other conflicting and supporting messages, is an essential part of [a] 
rhetorical analysis.”9 To reconstruct the rhetorical situation at the Credentials Committee 
required a repertoire of research including transcripts of testimonies, speeches and phone 
records throughout the period of the convention, journals and memoirs of President 
Johnson, news coverage during and immediately following the convention, and 
biographies of and interviews with the key players.  Much of this material was obtained 
from the archives of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Other material was collected 
from the historical, sociological and rhetorical analyses of other scholars.  
Concomitantly, the research gathered facilitates the recreation of the historical 
context and consequently of the rhetorical situation. My aim is to explore why out of all 
of the Freedom Delegates’ testimonies, Fannie Lou Hamer’s testimony elicited the 
greatest response from both Johnson and the public. The Mississippi sharecropper 
delivered an emotionally-laden testimony that seemed quite effective in gaining national 
sympathy momentarily, but was unsuccessful at maintaining the attention and support of 
her audience. I believe that her loss of legitimacy and public support is due to the 
constraints of her rhetorical situation. For example, the presence of the media impacted 
and altered the rhetorical interplay between Johnson, the Democratic delegates and the 
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Freedom delegates throughout the convention. But the media also played an important 
role in reflecting the crisis to the ultimate judge of this case—the audience: the nation.  
The shift in public response can be traced through the media’s presence (or lack 
thereof), coverage and interpretation of the events, and can illuminate one constraint of 
the rhetorical situation. But this thesis seeks to explore all of the constraints, and hopes 
to demonstrate how the constraints can be empowering one moment, and constraining in 
another moment. The social and political conscience, for example, existed during an 
extremely tumultuous time, particularly in regards to the issues of race and racism. As 
will be explained, Hamer embodied a moral symbolic power that addressed the social 
and political conscience by questioning the nation’s espoused ideals and challenging the 
country to redefine reality to better achieve those ideals. Yet ultimately, Hamer’s moral 
symbolic power was overshadowed, ironically, by a nation mourning the loss of 
Kennedy, a forerunner in civil rights, and the nomination of a president under the party 
whose platform had just proclaimed the protection of civil rights.  
As I previously stated, my aim is to offer an account of the rhetorical crisis at the 
Credentials Committee at the 1964 Democratic Convention. In his article, “A Skeptical 
View of Movement Studies,” David Zarefsky notes that “history has many dimensions,” 
and “like other phenomena, a historical movement can be studied from different points 
of view; the rhetorical historian complements the efforts of other scholars who examine 
the political dimensions, or the economic, or the cultural.”10 As with any case study, 
however, particularly of a historical event, there are many scholarly accounts and 
arguments from a wide array of perspectives and disciplines. Previous analyses and 
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descriptions offer a clearer understanding of the exigency that created this situation, and 
demonstrate the need for a rhetorical addition to their scholarship. Hence before I 
explore the rhetorical situation—exigency, audience and constraints—at the 1964 
Democratic National Convention, I offer a synopsis of the work of other scholars from a 
multitude of disciplines, which focuses on issues occurring around the time of the 
convention.  
The majority of this work emerges from the fields of history and sociology, and 
tends to emphasize the precursor to the development of Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party, Freedom Summer. Particularly from a historical and sociological standpoint, 
Freedom Summer is intriguing. Sociologists are fascinated with how it developed, 
uniting several of the civil rights groups for one poignant cause and acquiring members 
of the nation’s white youth as volunteers. A review of the research on Freedom Summer 
illustrates the sociological interest in the movement, and several key reasons seem to 
emerge to explain general scholarly interest in the Summer Project.  
To begin with, Freedom Summer was successful in a) gaining national attention 
and consequently putting Mississippi under strict legal scrutiny, b) demonstrating the 
ability of blacks and whites to work together, and c) registering black voters. As David 
Chalmers points out, “the summer’s national publicity and a grudging compliance with 
the new Civil Rights Law marked the end of ‘massive resistance’ in Mississippi.”11 
Providing a rhetorical analysis of the media coverage of Freedom Summer, Susan Weill 
performed a content analysis of newspapers in Mississippi that summer to analyze how 
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local news coverage framed the summer events for Southerners, thus contributing to how 
the events were handled.12  
According to scholars, the summer project was also a success in that it exhibited 
the power of collective action, and was unique in exhibiting the power of collective 
action of a racially integrated group during a racially tense time. As Nicholas Mills 
notes, it “revealed the power of black-and-white-together activism.”13 Doug McAdam 
explores this activism further in his analysis on “Gender as a Mediator of the Activist 
Experience: The Case of Freedom Summer.”14 Kenneth Andrews explores the impact of 
this particular social movement’s activism on the political process by assessing the black 
electoral politics in Mississippi before and after Freedom Summer. He notes that “civil 
rights mobilization shaped electoral outcomes 10 to 20 years after the peak of the 
movement.”15 According to Andrews, the strategies employed by Freedom Summer 
“escalated the pace of mobilization” and at the end of the summer, the problem was not 
“registering voters but electing Black candidates to office.”16 To many, the success of 
the project offered the potential to unite and the power to desegregate much more than 
Mississippi. 
Most sociology scholars also focus on the racial tension and dissension of 
Freedom Summer. Hence the second reason this Project is of particular interest to 
scholars is because from its inception, Freedom Summer elicited the ideological conflict 
that had been boiling beneath the surface of the Civil Rights Movement for some time—
the conflict that would ultimately cause a rift in the Movement as a whole. As Sally 
Belfrage remembers, “Black and white had to fight together in the movement, but the 
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fight was as much against its own internal racism as the outer world’s.”17 The seeds of 
discontent began with the very proposition of a project that incorporated white, middle-
class youths as volunteers for a black cause. When the Freedom Summer proposal was 
brought to the SNCC table by Bob Moses and Allard Lowenstein, the debate began. 
According to R. Edward Nordhaus, “many of [SNCC’s] leaders did not want to admit 
whites for fear that the whites might dominate and eventually take over the 
organization.”18 Nordhaus attributes this fear to two reasons: 
First, for the black worker to feel gratitude for the help of the while volunteers 
was to admit inferiority. Second, whereas the white volunteers could, literally, 
blend back into society after the summer, the blacks were fighting a battle that 
was a lifetime battle and one that could not be ignored or avoided.19 
Akinyele Umoja adds that the majority of the SNCC field staff opposed the summer 
proposal, afraid that the presence of whites would “discourage black initiative and self-
reliance. . . [possibly intimidating] Mississippi blacks with little formal education.”20 In 
the end, however, after three votes and a compromise that limited the number of white 
volunteers (a compromise that would be forgone during the course of the Project due to 
the hostile environmental demands requiring more volunteers), Freedom Summer was 
put into action. The Project proved so successful at registering voters, leaders shifted 
their focus to political representation. 
Thus at the end of the summer, the movement turned its entire attention to the 
goal of the Freedom Party. The idea of the party had been conceived during the initial 
creation of the goals of Freedom Summer. The party offered collective political action 
11 
against the regular Democrats in Mississippi. Instead of fighting in the South, the 
activists decided to fight in the North. While the Summer Project sought black voter 
registration, the Freedom Party sought to “unseat the all-white Mississippi delegation of 
the regular Democratic Party at the 1964 convention.”21 Because the regular Democrats 
succeeded in passing numerous laws that evaded the black vote in Mississippi, 
registering black voters was still a long way away from blacks actually voting. And 
because current political processes in the state effectively barred blacks from 
participating, the Freedom Party established a political process that paralleled that of the 
regulars.  
The Democratic Party protocol stated that any contested issues regarding 
delegate credentials must be presented two days before the actual convention, before the 
Credentials Committee. The Freedom Party had to elect its own delegation to attend the 
convention and contest the right of the regular Mississippi delegation. Barred from all 
regular state conventions, the members of the Freedom Party held their own precinct 
meetings, county elections and state convention. Their meetings and elections were held 
in accordance with the legal procedures of such events, given that they were not allowed 
to participate in the nationally recognized process for the state.  Mills documents this 
line of events, 
The Freedom Democrats moved forward in organizing their challenge against the 
regular Democrats, holding two weeks of precinct meetings in twenty-six 
counties in late July and early August. Thirty-five hundred people participated. 
Then came a week of county conventions in thirty-five counties at which 282 
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delegates were elected to go to the state convention in Jackson August 6. . . From 
among the people present, sixty-eight delegates and alternates were chosen to go 
to the national convention.22  
The Freedom delegation left Jackson, Mississippi by bus load, “eating soda crackers and 
drinking Cokes because they had little money for real meals,” and headed out to Atlantic 
City, New Jersey for the Democratic National Convention.23  
Because the life cycle of the Freedom Party was brief, there is not an extensive 
body of research on it. There are two prominent historical accounts, however, that offer 
intricate details of the events that occurred as the Freedom Delegates testified before the 
Credentials Committee at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. One of these 
accounts is presented in Kay Mills’s book, This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie 
Lou Hamer. The other account is by Nick Kotz in his book, Judgment Days: Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King Jr., and the Laws that Changed America.24 Mills 
and Kotz devote a chapter in each of their books that trace the events from the Freedom 
Party’s arrival in Atlantic City to the close of the convention. Mills focuses on Hamer’s 
role throughout the course of the convention while Kotz emphasizes Johnson’s struggle 
to appease the South, the North and the insurgent delegates without losing the public 
appearance of party unity.  
The majority of scholars, however, typically give the historical account of the 
events at this convention as a means of illustrating how the failure of the Freedom Party 
to secure its seats was, as Nordhaus notes, the “turning point of SNCC” and 
consequently of the Civil Rights Movement as a whole.25 Janice D. Hamlet touches 
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briefly upon a portion of Hamer’s testimony before the convention in an article entitled 
“Fannie Lou Hamer: The Unquenchable Spirit of the Civil Rights Movement,” and while 
Hamlet does examine the power of ethos and image in Hamer’s rhetorical behavior, she 
does so primarily through a multitude of excerpts from various speeches. 26 Most 
scholars, however, focus on the shift in social movement strategy and ideology. 
Summarizing Mills’s argument in Like A Holy Crusade, McMillen notes that 
The conflicts between black and white, indeed the deep-seated suspicion and 
anger felt by so many southern black organizers toward whites, were manageable 
until the Democratic National Convention offered only a token recognition to the 
[MFDP] at Atlantic City. . . Thereafter, the thin voice of interracialism was easily 
shouted down by the militant cry of white betrayal.27 
The political failure combined with their memory of a summer of violence created the 
breaking point for the movement. Everything seemed to come to a head with the failure 
of the Freedom Party: the racial tensions within the movement had been exacerbated 
during the summer; the strategies of nonviolence and working within the system seemed 
useless.  
Scholarly literature focuses almost exclusively on the black leaders and activists 
that were left in the wake of the Freedom Party’s failure, disillusioned with government 
support and distrustful of white people. The heated debates at the inception of Freedom 
Summer returned at the Freedom movement’s termination to disunite it. Mills laments 
the failure of the movement, noting that it “eroded black commitment to interracialism 
and nonviolence, and opened the way to the self-defeating tendencies of Black Power.”28 
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With the ideological split in SNCC, many of the great original leaders left the 
movement, including Bob Moses and Fannie Lou Hamer. A new leader, Stokely 
Carmichael, emerged, and with him, a new ideology: Black Power. Nordhaus 
summarizes the events, “The beatings by whites, passivity of the government, and 
betrayal by their allies had taken their toll. . . SNCC would counter violence with 
violence.”29 Hence the literature jumps from the events of Freedom Summer to the 
events post-Atlantic City, exploring the history, strategies and rhetoric of “black power” 
ideology.30  
There seems to be a good deal of literature on Carmichael himself, and the 
impact of the rhetoric of “black power” on activists, institutions, the general public, and 
the Civil Rights Movement as a whole. One such interested scholar, Charles J. Stewart, 
wrote, 
The unrealistic dreams of perfect social orders that permeate social movement 
rhetoric heighten expectations and demands that remain only dreams after years 
of struggle and suffering. Frustration builds within new generations of activists 
who become increasingly disaffected with social movement establishments 
which preach uninstitutionalized versions of patience and gradualism. The 
evolution of a revolution made leaders who can take advantages of opportunities, 
recreate and redefine social reality, offer new dreams, and energize a new 
generation of true believers. Stokely Carmichael’s rhetoric of black power can 
best be understood as a striving for evolutionary changes within the civil rights 
movement that would replace integration with black power and a passive, 
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common ground rhetoric with a militant, confrontational rhetoric better suited for 
his generation, growing disaffection for the movement, and the search for black 
Americans for their African roots.31 
Aside from pieces on black power rhetoric, there is virtually no communication literature 
on the rhetorical crisis at the 1964 Democratic National Convention.32 
 Hence, in this thesis, I plan to explore the rhetorical dimension of the convention 
by reconstructing the rhetorical exigency as it developed at the Credentials Committee. I 
approach the events of the convention from a historical perspective.33 In regard to the 
rhetorical strategies employed by the Freedom Democrats, I am primarily interested in 
understanding why Fannie Lou Hamer was labeled by news coverage as the most 
“dramatic” of all of the Freedom delegates.34 I explore how Hamer’s rhetoric is different 
from the rhetoric of the other Freedom delegates that day, causing her speech to provoke 
a deluge of calls from the nation in support of her cause, and yet failing to maintain that 
support after the Freedom Party rejected President Johnson’s compromise.  
Aside from Hamer’s speech, I aim to illuminate what Robert S. Cathcart calls the 
“rhetorical transactions” that took place between the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party and the “established system” or “controlling agency.”35 I am interested in the shifts 
in rhetorical strategies of both the Freedom Democrats and the “regular” Democrats 
throughout the course of the convention. The rhetorical exigency was constrained not 
just by what was said by the Freedom Democrats or by President Johnson, but by the 
presence and response of the media, and thus the public. For example, the lawyer for the 
Freedom Party, Joseph Rauh, struggled to the last minute to secure the presence of the 
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media in the Credentials Committee meeting, where Hamer and the other Freedom Party 
representatives were scheduled to testify. The media’s presence provoked Johnson’s 
alleged command to cut Hamer off of the air before she was done speaking, but also 
inhibited him from forcibly removing the Freedom Party members who stormed the 
actual convention hall to take the seats of the regular, all-white representatives.  
I intend to explore the role of the media in both facilitating these rhetorical 
transactions and impacting the effectiveness of the rhetorical strategies of both the 
Freedom Democrats and regular Democrats. This role of the media in leading, focusing, 
and shaping the public’s view of the Freedom Party cannot be ignored as a significant 
constraint. Because there were various messages throughout the convention that 
competed for legitimacy, the media held a strong role in the development of the 
rhetorical situation. The public’s acceptance or rejection of one articulated reality over 
another was at the very least partially influenced by the media. 
 However, public legitimation was also constrained by a host of other factors, 
such as the continued mourning of John F. Kennedy, President Johnson’s acceptance of 
the party nomination, Humphrey’s nomination as vice president and the generally 
accepted rituals of convention rhetoric. In particular, this final factor could very well 
have been an important influence in the public’s response, as the rhetoric of the Freedom 
Party representatives was disruptive and not in accordance with typical convention 
protocol.36 As the rhetorical situation evolved in response to the various constraints, the 
Freedom Party’s strategy to juxtapose rhetorical speech and rhetorical acts might have 
been too radical in such a conservative context.  
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 Ultimately, I seek to contribute a rhetorical dimension to a historical case study. 
Zarefsky explained the contribution of a rhetorical scholar’s analysis of social 
movements on the scope of history. Indeed, the cross-fertilization of disciplines offers 
the potential for a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of an event. By 
offering a rhetorical analysis to what has previously been analyzed predominately 
through a historical lens, I intend to contribute a more thorough understanding of Fannie 
Lou Hamer and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the 1964 National 
Democratic Convention. This case study is ideal for understanding the demands that a 
rhetorical situation places on the orators’ rhetorical strategies, empowering and 
simultaneously limiting their effectiveness. I believe that this rhetorical analysis will 
suggest further directions for future research in comprehending this powerful, albeit 
brief, rhetorical situation—a situation which just might have been the precipitating event 
for the Democratic Party’s troubles over the years. 
 In Chapter I, I offer a foundation of key concepts and events crucial to 
understanding this particular rhetorical situation. The chapter begins by exploring the 
political and social context in which the testimonies were delivered. The chapter 
introduces Omi and Winant’s concept of racial formation and racial projects, then, 
drawing from the works of Campbell and Jamieson, explains the ideas of rhetorical form 
and genre. Next, the chapter looks at the rhetorical significance of Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic power. Then the chapter introduces the importance of Riker’s concept of 
heresthetics in the development of the rhetorical crisis. Finally, the chapter sets the stage 
for the rhetorical situation with the historical context that led up to the Credentials 
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Committee hearing and the rest of the 1964 Democratic National Convention. The 
purpose of Chapter I is to create a foundation for the rhetorical situation. 
 Chapter II builds on this foundation. In this chapter, the dramatic testimony of 
the Freedom Party is presented. This chapter continues to build upon the rhetorical 
situation—exploring the ways in which the exigence evolved, and with it, the ways in 
which the rhetorical strategies evolved. 
 Hamer’s testimony was labeled by news reporters as the most dramatic of all of 
the testimonies that day. Because her testimony exemplified the power and constraint 
within the Freedom Party’s rhetorical strategy, Chapter III offers a close reading of 
Hamer’s testimony. Building on concepts from Chapter I, this chapter explores how her 
testimony exemplifies a rhetorical strategy that toggles between traditional political 
convention rhetorical form and an evolving, black rhetorical form. Chapter III also 
returns to Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic power, and introduces another concept—
enactment. Using these concepts, the purpose of Chapter III is to illuminate the 
rhetorical exigence. 
 Chapter IV returns to the rhetorical situation to explain how the rhetorical crisis 
resolved and to wrap up the events that occurred during the remainder of the convention. 
The purpose of Chapter IV is to give not only a historical account of the four days of the 
convention, but to examine how the rhetorical situation concluded. Specifically, this 
chapter explores Johnson’s response to the exigence, an exigence that included the 
symbolic power of the Freedom Party’s racial project, and the continued struggle over 
that symbolic power. This chapter also examines the media’s rhetorical construction of 
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the events, and suggests that the media’s role, combined with Johnson’s rhetorical 









THE VANTAGE POINT REVISITED  
 
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever 
they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional 
right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.  
–Lincoln, First Inaugural 
 
In 1948, Truman issued an Executive Order that prohibited segregation in the 
nation’s armed forces and forbade discrimination in federal employment and 
government contract facilities. In protest, the Southern Delegates staged a walkout from 
the 1948 Democratic Party Convention and created the States’ Rights Democratic Party, 
otherwise known as the Dixiecrats, which although politically unsuccessful, continued to 
propagate white supremacy throughout the South.1  By 1954, the Supreme Court had 
declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional in the landmark case of Brown v. 
Board. It wasn’t until 1957, when Melba Beals and her eight friends were escorted by 
Eisenhower’s 101st airborne soldiers into Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
that the first black students entered a previously all-white, Southern public school.2  
 With a country full of resistance, the disparity between law and practice left 
much to be desired of desegregation and racial equality. As the Southern states 
continued to mobilize their defenses, civil rights activists mobilized the wide array of 
grassroots organizations into a cohesive movement, using collective action and powerful 
rhetoric to diminish the gap between political policies and reality. In the sixties, this 
struggle broke the bonds of silence that had gagged past social and political efforts, and 
progressed beyond the Mason-Dixon Line to the top of the national agenda.  
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As civil rights issues penetrated political platforms, the country was forced to 
reexamine race. In their book, Racial Formation in the United States, Omi and Winant 
present a compelling account of racial dynamics within the United States, particularly as 
they appear in the political arena. They note that race is “an unstable and ‘decentered’ 
complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle.” 3  They 
argue that race is not simply a concrete, biological construct; but nor is it merely an 
“illusion” or “ideological construct.”4 The sixties illuminated the white majority’s 
dilemma of comprehending race, and set the stage for a new analysis of race as a 
structural and cultural problem.  Omi and Winant define this concept of race as 
“signif[ying] and symboliz[ing] social conflicts and interests by referring to different 
types of human bodies.”5 From this definition, Omi and Winant propose a theory of 
racial formation, which is “the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are 
created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”6 They posit that “racial projects” occur 
when groups organize to represent and explain the current racial dynamics in an effort to 
“reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines.”7 Thus the 
importance of the rhetoric that was developed and employed by civil rights activists 
during the sixties is seen in challenging not only the discrepancies within the national 
law, but the hypocrisies embedded in the national rhetoric of equality.  
To reflect back on the rhetorical crisis at the Credentials Committee at the 1964 
Democratic Convention demonstrates the persuasive power in the mere presence of the 
Freedom Delegates on the national political agenda.  And yet simultaneously, the crisis 
illustrates the limitations placed on their rhetoric by a political and social consciousness 
22 
that had just begun to struggle with how to redefine race and define racism. The 
testimony of Fannie Lou Hamer, in particular, exemplifies this juxtaposition of the 
persuasive power and the heresthetic limitations of this rhetorical interaction between the 
insurgents and society.8 In order to understand the rhetorical interplay between Fannie 
Lou Hamer and the American public, it is crucial to understand the social and political 
context in which Hamer testified and her audience judged.  
The purpose of this chapter is to create a foundation for understanding this 
rhetorical situation by establishing key concepts and events. Drawing from the works of 
Karlyn Campbell, Kathleen Jamieson and Pierre Bourdieu, this chapter defines the 
concepts of rhetorical form and symbolic power. The chapter outlines the evolving 
exigence before and up to the beginning of the Credentials Committee hearing. The 
chapter also introduces emerging constraints and strategies within this rhetorical 
situation, setting the stage for the dramatic testimonies that Chapter II presents.  
Form and Power 
First, it is necessary to understand the traditional rhetorical forms that confronted 
and shaped the rhetorical strategies during the hearing. The rich tradition of political 
convention rhetoric is deeply seeded in American history and deeply rooted in American 
consciousness. There is a shared expectation for how political conventions proceed, and 
this expectation far exceeds Robert’s Rules of Order.  
The pomp and circumstance that has become associated with national party 
conventions began with the gathering of a third party, the Anti-Masons, in 1831. One 
year later, the Democrats nominated Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren in what 
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would become the first national convention of a major party. The Republicans followed 
suit in 1856. Since then, the nation has developed a political convention protocol. In his 
article, “Political Conventions as Legitimation Ritual,” Thomas B. Farrell writes, “The 
optimal convention ritual begins with the statement and demonstration of theme, 
progresses to the clustering of roles and generic personae, and culminates in the 
anointing of the person who condenses, symbolizes, and enacts the theme.”9 This is the 
traditional form of the political convention. 
This traditional form of political convention elicits a traditional form of political 
convention rhetoric. This traditional rhetoric is expressed in several ways. Farrell notes, 
The statement and expression of theme is of initial importance to political 
convention ritual. Traditionally, such statement has been the responsibility of 
keynote and guest speakers. As the musical etymology of keynote suggests, one 
responsibility of such a speaker is to sound the theme of the convention in a 
“responsive chord”—one which will set a proper mood for the proceedings. . . In 
addition to articulating a central theme through ceremonial discourse, each 
political convention ritual will display a cluster of role archetypes, to lend a sense 
of historical continuity, generic permanence, and audience recognition. . . [and 
finally] Whether any political convention effectively initiates its chosen 
candidates, and offers an effective strategy for gaining and using power will 
depend upon the actual performance of the candidates themselves.10 
This traditional form of political convention rhetoric develops the context and dictates 
the rules for all those who engage in it. This form is the key to power in this context. For 
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this reason, perhaps it is best to pause and explain what is meant by this use of “power” 
and “rhetorical form.” 
In an introduction to a collection of essays on form and genre, Karlyn Campbell 
and Kathleen Jamieson emphasize the importance of forms in rhetorical criticism. They 
note,  
Rhetorical forms that establish genres are stylistic and substantive responses to 
perceived situational demands. In addition, forms are central to all types of 
criticism because they define the unique qualities of any rhetorical act, and 
because they are the means through which we come to understand how an act 
works to achieve its ends.11 
In the rhetorical crisis at the 1964 convention, the Freedom Party was confronted with 
the constraint of a powerful, established, traditional form of political convention rhetoric 
and subsequently the limitations of their own emerging, evolving rhetorical form. 
Consequently, the Freedom Party had to develop a strategic form that would work within 
the previously established rhetorical framework of the convention, and capture the 
symbolic power needed to redefine national connotations of race and racism. 
The concept of symbolic power comes from Bourdieu, who defines it as “a 
power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of 
confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and 
thus the world itself.”12 In the context of the 1964 Credential Committee, it is quite 
evident that the challengers were challenging the Democratic Party’s, and 
simultaneously the nation’s, vision of the world. There was a discrepancy between law 
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and practice. There was a discrepancy between Southern Democrats and the National 
Democratic Creed. There was a serious discrepancy between the espoused American 
dream and reality. The goal of the Freedom Party was to gain the symbolic power that 
was then being denied blacks—the power to redefine how the nation understood race 
and equality and democracy. The rhetorical goal was to transform reality through 
testimonies that illustrated these discrepancies and illuminated a new vision of the world. 
The difficulty of this task is marked by the speech that Chairman Lawrence gave 
at the start of the Credential Committee hearings. He urged the members and press to 
remember Kennedy (a theme through the political convention ritual), and Kennedy’s 
goals for the nation. He read a passage from one of Kennedy’s speeches: 
We in this country, in this generation, are by destiny, rather than choice, the 
watchmen on the walls of world freedom. We ask, therefore, that we may be 
worthy of our power and responsibility that we may exercise our strength with 
wisdom and restraint, and that we may achieve in our time, for all time, the 
ancient vision of peace on earth, good will toward men. That must always be our 
goal; and the righteousness of our cause must always underlie our strength.13 
By evoking what had become a nationally sacred memory of the former president, 
Chairman Lawrence was establishing a theme and consequently conveying an image of 
“unity and affirmed consensus.”14  
 This is the rhetorical form that the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party was 
pitted against. In fact, it is not just a form, it is a genre. Campbell and Jamieson note, “If 
the recurrences of similar forms establish a genre, then genres are groups of discourses 
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which share substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics.”15 Democratic 
conventions are rhetorical contexts in which similar forms had established a rhetorical 
genre—as Farrell’s article terms traditional political convention rhetoric. At each 
Democratic convention, the speeches that are made convey similar ideas and evoke 
similar ideals belonging not just to the Democratic Party but also to the American dream 
of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This rhetorical form espouses equality and 
supports its claim with the document inscribed with the precious words “All men are 
created equal.” The Freedom Democrats had to shadow-box this rhetorical form, hoping 
to illuminate the ghosts of inequality that haunted it. In order to challenge the reality, 
they had to challenge the rhetorical form.  
What is unique about the Freedom Democrats is that the various testimonies they 
offered wove rhetorical forms in and out of the traditional convention rhetoric genre. 
Before this is explained further, however, the rhetorical exigence that motivated the 
Freedom Party to confront the powerful political and social traditions should be 
explained. Through this explanation, the traditional form of the political convention and 
the struggle of the regular Democrats—including Johnson—to uphold this traditional 
form will be illuminated. 
The Exigence: Pre-Credentials Committee 
On June 19, 1964, the Senate passed the Civil Rights Act, which had been 
introduced by Kennedy just one year earlier. Three days later Andrew Goodman, 
Michael Schwerner and James Chaney disappeared in Nashoba County while 
volunteering for the Freedom Summer voter registration project. On July 2, President 
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Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, banning segregation and authorizing legal recourse 
for racial discrimination. In response, the Mississippi regular delegates passed a 
resolution at their state convention that said, “We believe in the separation of the races in 
all phases of life.”16 Fifteen days later, Aaron Henry,17 the Chairman of the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party, wrote a letter to John Bailey, the Chairman of the 
Democratic National Convention and informed Bailey of the Freedom Party’s intent to 
send a full delegation and alternates to the Democratic National Convention.  
In the letter Henry stated, “Our delegation will represent Democratic residents of 
the State of Mississippi who are loyal to the United States Constitution and to the 
National Democratic Party and most of whom are barred from the “regular” Democratic 
Party by terroristic and other un-Constitutional methods.” He then laid out the 
nominating process of the Freedom Delegates. Their procedures mirrored those of the 
“regular” party and acted in accordance with Mississippi law, except, Henry wrote, “our 
meetings will be open to all Democrats while their meetings effectively bar Negroes.” 
Already, the Freedom Party’s mere formation and procedures were challenging the 
traditional form of the National Democratic Party.  
On August 4, the murdered bodies of the three volunteers were found. Two days 
later, in Jackson, Mississippi, Ella Baker presented the keynote address for the Freedom 
Party’s state convention. She said, “The symbol of politics in Mississippi lies in those 
three bodies that were dug from the earth this week.”18 Documenting the Freedom 
Party’s state convention, television reporters asked Joseph Rauh,19 the Freedom Party’s 
legal representation, if he thought this case had a chance before the Democratic National 
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Convention. Rauh declared, “. . . before those national television cameras, there’s no 
doubt in my mind that they [the states] will go [vote] with us.” He added, “If we have 
eight states and eleven members of the credentials committee, we can win.”20 In the 
background emerged a large black woman who began to lead the crowd in the chant, 
“Eleven and eight!” This woman was Fannie Lou Hamer. Her boisterous presence, 
coupled with Rauh’s confidence, created concern in the White House. 
The president resented Rauh’s involvement. Rauh remembered the political 
games of that summer well. He reflected on the events that transpired between Johnson 
and himself, and noted that “Johnson . . . [believed that] ‘every man has his price.’ Since 
I obviously was a serious figure in this thing, he tried to get me out of it.” The president, 
his experience in the Senate of placing people under political pressure providing him 
with confidence in his persuasive power, called up Senator Hubert Humphrey and UAW 
President Walter Reuther, both of whom were political allies and business associates of 
Rauh. In essence, Rauh recalled, “the president told them, ‘You tell that bastard god 
damn lawyer friend of yours that there ain’t gonna be all that eleven and eight shit at the 
convention.’”21 So Johnson began his covert campaign to uphold the traditional form of 
national conventions. 
The pressure from Rauh’s political allies Humphrey and Reuther was intense. In 
an interview, Rauh remembered the most hysterical of all the phone calls he received 
from Johnson’s pit bulls. Rauh recounted his conversation with Reuther: 
Walter said, “I’ve been talking to the president and we have agreed that if you go 
through with this, we’re going to lose the election.” I said, “Are you serious? 
29 
Goldwater has been nominated! How can you lose it!” He said, “We both think 
the backlash is so tremendous that either we’re going to lose the Negro vote if 
you go through with this and don’t win, or if you do win, the picture of your all 
black delegation going on the floor to replace the white one is going to add to the 
backlash. We really think that Goldwater’s going to be president.”22 
Humphrey was far less threatening than Reuther was to Rauh. Looking back, Rauh notes 
that he felt that Humphrey’s nomination as vice president was dependent on how he 
handled the Freedom Party situation. It was Johnson’s test of his potential running mate. 
In his interview in 1969, however, Rauh was adamant that the world should know that 
Humphrey “never once, even when his vice presidency was at stake there, did he ever 
say, ‘Joe, you’ve got to take this settlement to help me.’ Never once.” Rauh told the 
interviewer, “We would be alone at 4 in the morning negotiating, but he’d never use our 
relationships. To me that was the highest ethical standard.”23 Johnson, on the other hand, 
found Rauh’s involvement a betrayal of their friendship. 
Johnson was bewildered not only by the involvement of Rauh, but by the choice 
of timing on the part of the activists. Were they ungrateful for all that he had 
accomplished for them? Why were they so impatient for all that he intended to do for 
them in the next four years? Did they not realize that to create a calamity at the 
convention would destroy the opportunity for his nomination and subsequent election? 
And then who would help them? Certainly not Barry Goldwater!  
Johnson expressed his frustration with the Freedom Delegates in several phone 
calls with White House aides and other politicians. In one such phone call between 
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Johnson and Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz, the president bemoans the Freedom Party’s 
actions, “If the liberals weren’t in charge, and didn’t have the president, and didn’t have 
the vice president, and didn’t have the platform, and didn’t have everything they want, 
they ought to do this [Freedom Democrats challenge]; they do [have all of those 
things].”24 Johnson expressed a similar sentiment in a phone conversation with 
Humphrey. With agitation ringing in his voice, the president appealed to his mediator, 
“See if the Negroes don’t realize that they’ve got the president, they’ll have the vice 
president, they’ve got the law, they’ll have the government for four years–that’ll be fair 
with them, be just with them, and why in the livin’ hell do they want to hand shovel 
Goldwater fifteen states?”25 
Rauh found no validity in Johnson’s threats of a Goldwater victory and 
maintained his position that they had a strong, legitimate case. On August 13, when the 
Mississippi state court ruled that it would bar the insurgent group from using the 
Democratic name, Rauh informed the press that his group would continue to fight in 
spite of the court’s ruling. In his personal files, White House aide Bill Moyers noted, 
“Chairman Bailey said that he will recommend that neither delegation be put on 
temporary roll and that the question of which to seat should go before the credentials 
committee.”26 Confident, the young attorney cautioned Johnson that any attempts to 
remove his legal counsel from the case would prove more problematic than to address 
the legal breach. A memo written by a White House aide outlines Rauh’s position for the 
president: 
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1. The Freedom Party was not his [Rauh’s] idea, and he would be just as happy if 
it would evaporate. 
2. Clearly the Freedom Party supporters and Joe have as their primary principal 
objective your victory in November. 
3. If you believe Joe should pull out of the case, he will do so, although it is his 
view that the control over the case will then pass to communist lawyers...27 
4. [His brief] studies and finds that the regulars have failed to meet the Party 
Requirements.28  
The brief mentioned in the memo was Rauh’s source of strength and security. Assisted 
by Eleanor K. Holmes and H. Miles Jaffe, Rauh had prepared the brief weeks before the 
convention. He was particularly proud of his research referring to the 1944 convention, 
in which two delegations from Texas were seated and split the vote of the state. Rauh 
notes, “Nobody was going to vote in the ‘44 convention. Roosevelt was going to be 
renominated, so what was the use of fighting? Let everybody be seated, like a party. 
Why don’t you do the same thing? Nobody’s going to vote in ‘64.”29  
But Johnson’s legal aides cautioned Johnson’s consideration of an appropriate 
course of action. In their analysis of the situation, the aides laid out both sides of the 
argument. They told the president to avoid “weakening [his] civil rights image. . .having 
delegations walk out. . .inquiring into the legality of other state delegations. . .an 
extended floor debate. . .physical violence. . .and encouraging massive civil rights 
demonstrations in Atlantic City and throughout the country.”30 Johnson was faced with a 
plethora of pitfalls, one of which found Johnson before he even had the chance to find it.  
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On August 19, just five days before the convention, Moyers sent Johnson a 
memo warning him of a planned demonstration outside the convention hall. The memo 
stated that a good friend of Moyers, Robert Spike of the National Council of Churches, 
had told Moyers that many of the civil rights groups throughout the nation had heard of 
the challenges the Freedom Democrats were facing in their struggle to be seated. They 
decided to “mount a serious demonstration on Monday afternoon in Atlantic City, [and] 
that it could continue throughout the week, with the biggest efforts coming on 
Wednesday.”31 Despite these events and Johnson’s obvious preoccupation with 
attempting to dispel any possibility for a floor fight to ensue, his journals and memoirs 
do not mention the crisis at all: “Atlantic City in August 1964 was a place of happy, 
surging crowds and thundering cheers. To a man as troubled as I was by party and 
national divisions, this display of unity was welcome indeed.”32 
The Evolving Exigence: Crisis at the Credentials Committee 
On Saturday, August 22, just a few hours before the hearing began, Aaron Henry 
wrote a telegram to President Johnson. The telegram read: 
Yesterday the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party completed its 1200 mile 
bus trip to the Democratic National Convention. Our trip has, in many ways, 
been one of discovery . . . Your benevolent neutrality, we believe, contrasts with 
the tight control the Republican Party leadership imposes upon its delegates in 
San Francisco, and we urge you to maintain this truly Democratic attitude . . . 
whatever the outcome of this fight to be seated, we want you to know we will 
support you with all our hearts in the upcoming election.33 
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Attached to the telegram was a memo from White House Special Assistant Paul Popple 
to the president, which read, “Over the past few days, we have received a total of 416 
telegrams supporting the seating of the Freedom Party delegation; most of these have 
come in yesterday and today. Only one telegram has come in supporting the regular 
delegation.” 34 People from all over the country, but primarily from New York, New 
Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania and California, had sent telegrams to the White House in 
support of the Freedom Party. They were from a wide array of the American public—
students, doctors, wives, even congressmen.  
Most telegrams simply read, “Seat the MFDP.” One telegram in particular was 
signed from a group of congressmen. It read, “In light of the fact that the Mississippi 
Democratic Party is segregated and has not pledged support for the National Democratic 
Ticket, we strongly urge you Seat the MFDP.”35 Although the majority of the telegrams 
were overwhelmingly supportive of the Freedom Party, several disturbing messages 
from opponents would arrive later, primarily prominent southerners. For example, 
Congressman L.C. Lowe of Mississippi sent a telegram warning Johnson that the 
Democrats were losing the South, and that many Southern Democrats were afraid to 
even go to the convention, as undoubtedly it would ruin their careers in their respective 
States.36 
The telegrams would not be enough to bring a roll call vote to the floor. Rauh 
knew that the presence of the press during the testimonies would be crucial to the case: 
politicians would respond differently to the undeniably confrontational rhetoric of the 
Freedom Delegates if the proceedings took place in the sunshine of the public’s presence 
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than if they occurred behind closed doors. Less than an hour before the Credentials 
Committee began, Rauh was stopped in the hallway by television newsman Sandy 
Vanocur. In an interview with Kay Mills, Rauh recalled, “He [Vanocur] came to me in 
the middle of the afternoon and he said, ‘Joe, they’ve screwed you.’ I said, ‘My god, 
already?’”  He came back and said you and I have got this thing open. They’re going to 
have television and cameras and everything.”37  
The issue of securing the public’s presence at the testimonies introduces the 
struggle for control of the heresthetic. Heresthetic is a word coined by William H. Riker 
in his book, The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution. 
Riker writes 
Heresthetic is a word I coined from a Greek root for choosing and deciding, and I 
use it to describe the art of setting up situations—composing the alternatives 
among which political actors must choose—in such a way that even those who 
do not wish to do so are compelled by the structure of the situation to support the 
heresthetician’s purpose. [Heresthetic differs from rhetoric because there is much 
more than eloquence and elegance involved in heresthetic. People win politically 
by more than rhetorical attraction. Typically they win because they have set up 
the situation in such a way that other people will want to join them—or feel 
forced by circumstances to join them—even without any persuasion at all.38 
This idea of heresthetic plays an important role in this particular rhetorical situation. 
Throughout the remainder of the convention, it will serve to empower and constrain both 
the Freedom Party, and Johnson and the regular Democrats. The struggle between them 
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to be the heresthetician will illuminate the constant manipulation and shifts in power that 
forced rhetorical strategies to be altered.   
 For example, a look back at Johnson’s frustration with the emergence of the 
Freedom Party demonstrates the initial struggle for heresthetic control. Johnson seemed 
bewildered at the sense of timing on the part of the Freedom Party. He sought control of 
the convention, and believed that any agitation would cost him either his nomination or 
election. Yet for the Freedom Party, and the civil rights organizations that they 
represented, there was no better time to protest. They had struggled for centuries in an 
effort to establish equality, and Johnson’s presence in the White House offered an 
opportunity to take another step forward. When Johnson set Reuther and Humphrey on 
Rauh, he attempted to establish heresthetic control over the events at the convention.  
When it looked as though Rauh and the Freedom Party would be at the 
convention anyway, the next struggle for heresthetic control developed over the issue of 
the press’s presence at the hearing. Johnson attempted to control the situation and make 
sure that the hearing was conducted in a room too small for the press. Unfortunately for 
Johnson, Rauh made a scene. The young attorney demanded that the hearing be moved 
to a room big enough for the regular democrats, the credentials committee, the Freedom 
delegates and the press. In a phone conversation with Reuther, Johnson relayed his 
concern over Rauh “raising hell” in Atlantic City: 
He’s gonna get it. I don’t know. Maybe I better get your judgment on these 
things. He looks like [he’s] trying to start around [to] get more on television. We 
can not. . . I think the more they get [on television] the worse we are. . .Our 
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people say that they’re causing trouble and they’re gonna have to go and move it 
to another room but if they’re gonna get a compromise out of him and get him to 
agree to not just ruin the election for us then maybe we ought to go along with 
him. My experience has been on these things that when you try to put a top on a 
tea kettle sometimes it blows off and sometimes you have to give a man a little 
rope. On the other hand, I just hate to see it cost us.”39  
Reuther promised Johnson that Rauh agreed that if he could “have his show,” he would 
agree to go along with a reasonable compromise when it was offered. Johnson conceded, 
“I think I’ll say to him, ‘Go on and move it to a bigger room.’ I don’t give a damn if he 
puts on a little show as long as he don’t wreck us; if he comes out right. I think it’s a 
good thing to give these fellows a little encouragement once and awhile.”40 In this 
instance, Rauh acted as the heresthetician, setting up the rhetorical situation so that the 
crisis would be presented in front of the whole country. It seems safe to assume that had 
the press not been at the hearings, events would have proceeded in an entirely different 
manner.  
In fact, the Freedom Party depended on the presence of the press. Without the 
cameras and reporters, regular delegates, specifically Southerners, were free to reign; 
with the cameras and reporters, the Freedom delegates were free to protest. So there was 
little to no fear in the Freedom Party as they entered the convention hall and that “were 
seated directly opposite the party regulars.”41 According to Freedom delegate Leslie 
McLemore, “Some of the Freedom Democrats saw their plantation ‘bosses’; some saw 
the women for whom they had worked as maids and cooks, and others, perhaps, saw 
37 
some of their fellow townsmen.”42 The seats of the Freedom delegates were 
diametrically opposed to that of their white counterparts, many of whom had used their 
power as a reign of terror in the South. But here, looking around at the numerous 
television cameras and reporters, the Freedom delegates knew that this time, the 
confrontation would be mediated by the watchful eye of the public. Here, they had a 
chance.  
This chapter created a foundation for understanding the rhetorical situation of the 
1964 Democratic National Convention. By establishing key concepts and events, the 
chapter outlined the evolving exigence before and up to the beginning of the Credentials 
Committee hearing. This chapter has introduced Bitzer’s elements of a rhetorical 
situation that were explained in the introduction—the controlling exigence, the audience 
and the set of constraints.  
The “controlling exigence” at the convention was the Freedom Party’s 
confrontation of the moral and legal right of the regular Mississippi delegates to sit and 
represent Mississippi at the convention. The ominous situation in the South prompted the 
creation of the Freedom Party, or what Omi and Winant would call a “racial project,” 
that sought to reorganize and redistribute power through the symbolic power of 
rhetorical speech.  Hence, this chapter sought to introduce the importance of rhetorical 
strategy and its ability to empower as well as constrain the orators. As the exigence 
creates waves in the pond of the nation’s social and political conscience, it will become 
apparent that the decisions and actions of the key players in their use, manipulation or 
invention of rhetorical form yields and constrains the power throughout this rhetorical 
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situation. What does this power provide? The power presents the opportunity to redefine 
the waters of the pond; to redefine reality. So, as the players struggle along with their 
physical and symbolic spaces, they are struggling to redefine reality for an audience 
much bigger than the Credentials Committee: the nation. 
In the beginning of this thesis, it was noted that Bitzer once said that once the 
orator engages in the rhetorical situation, “both he and his speech are additional 
constituents.”43 The link between rhetorical form and symbolic power will develop 
throughout the remainder of this thesis.  The next chapter will continue to develop the 
rhetorical situation and highlight the elements of the rhetorical situation—exigence, 
audience and set of constraints—by presenting the dramatic case that the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party delivered before the Credentials Committee and the entire 
nation. After all, it was the testimonies that cast waves into the social and political pond 






What happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun?  
Or fester like a sore--And then run? Does it stink like rotten meat? Or crust and sugar 
over--like a syrupy sweet? Maybe it just sags like a heavy load.  
Or does it explode? –Langston Hughes1 
 
The case set forth by the Freedom Democrats had to appeal to a number of 
different audiences. Obviously there was the Credentials Committee, who would 
determine whether or not the issue went to the floor for a roll-call vote. But their 
testimony appealed to a moral power, and that was addressed to those beyond the 
convention hall. It was addressed to the nation. The Freedom delegates were asking to 
reshape the traditional way of politically representing the state of Mississippi, but they 
asked to reshape the country. This appeal was aimed at the conscience of the country. 
Dave Dennis, a member of CORE, stressed the exigence. Those that were selected to 
testify had to reach what he called “the living dead—those who do not care and those 
who care but have no guts.”2 Only if America could understand the racial exigence 
inherent in the system could they gain the support they needed to win this fight.  
Chapter I introduced several key concepts and events crucial to understanding 
this rhetorical situation. This chapter presents the dramatic case that the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party delivered to the Credentials Committee and to America. The 
rhetorical strategies of the testimonies will be analyzed in Chapter III, which builds on 
the concepts of rhetorical form and symbolic power. Before an in-depth reading of the 
testimonies is offered, however, the case must be presented. What follows is a 
reconstructed account of the rhetorical situation the day of the hearing. 
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Chairman David Lawrence called the Credentials Committee to order. This 
hearing tribunal had gathered two days before the official start of the Democratic 
National Convention to sit in judgment of four contests (contesting the legal right of the 
entire delegation of a state) and one contest for resolution (contesting the legal right of 
certain delegates within a state delegation). The entire delegations from Alabama, 
Mississippi, Puerto Rico and the territory of the Virgin Islands were contested, while 
specific alternates within the Oregon delegation were brought into question. The 
Pennsylvania Governor urged the delegates to remember that the ultimate goal was the 
“smashing Democratic victory” and that while “some of the cases are charged with 
emotion,” their duty was to “listen to the arguments dispassionately and to reach a 
conclusion which is both legal and proper.”3 
At 2:55pm, Rauh stood before Governor Lawrence, the one-hundred and ten 
members of the Credentials Committee, and the television cameras that had almost not 
seen this event due to political ploys to silence this issue. Rauh addressed the committee 
members, all the while acutely aware of the cameras, “In this hour I shall show you that 
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party is the loyal, legal, and long-suffering body of 
Mississippi.”4 He began to present the case of the Freedom Party. The first witness 
called to the stand was the Chairman of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 
Aaron Henry. 
The forty-two year old had come a long way from his sharecropper family’s 
home in the Mississippi Delta. Well-educated, Henry had graduated with a degree in 
pharmacy from Xavier University, New Orleans, in 1950 on the GI Bill. He had been 
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active with the NAACP ever since his high school teacher had introduced the 
organization to his class.5 Now the president of the Mississippi Branch of the NAACP 
and Chairman of the Freedom Party sat before the convention and cameras in a dark 
business suit, his neck tie centered perfectly in the collar of his crisp, white shirt. His 
testimony established the position of the Freedom Party, justifying its inception and 
development by systematically demonstrating the atrocities that Mississippi blacks 
faced.  
Henry carefully explained the statistics of poverty and voter registration among 
blacks in the state. He conceded that he was a registered voter, but that this was due to 
his level of education—an anomaly in the black population of Mississippi, which had the 
“lowest academic attainment” in the nation. He outlined the terrorism that blacks 
encountered at the hands of white, Mississippi leaders—leaders who sat in this very 
convention hall under the guise of being part of the Democratic Party and yet repeatedly 
demonstrated through both words and deeds that they did not support LBJ or the 
Democratic platform. Henry read a quote by Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson, head of 
the Democratic Party, in which the governor, in a statement in reference to the murder of 
the three civil rights workers said, “No one in Mississippi condones murder, but we are 
not going to be run over.”6 The legal counsel in the Democratic Party, Mississippian 
E.C. Collins, stated, in regard to segregation, “We must win this fight regardless of the 
cost in human lives.”7 The enthymeme was clear: Delegates of the Democratic Party 
should adhere to the party’s platform, which includes support of the Civil Rights Act as 
well as of President Johnson, and represent their constituents. The Mississippi regulars 
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clearly did not support desegregation, had spoken out against LBJ and his signing of the 
Civil Rights Act, and did not support almost half of their state’s population. Therefore, 
the Mississippi regulars were unfit to serve as representatives in the Democratic Party. 
Henry shifted his address directly to the American public, “Those watching these 
proceedings who want to know what you can do to help Mississippi, send telegrams to 
State Democratic Delegates asking that they vote to seat the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party.” He concluded with an appeal in which he explained why freedom 
could no longer be delayed, postponed, or deferred. “Langston Hughes,” Henry spoke, 
“somehow sums up this frustration in his ‘What happens to a dream deferred?’” He then 
read the poem and finished, “The answer is up to you. Thank you kindly for your 
attention.”8 Fourteen years later, almost to the day, T.H. Barker asked Henry in an 
interview, “Did you really think that you could be seated as the delegation from 
Mississippi, or did you just intend to bring up the issue, or what?” Henry replied, “Yes. 
We went to win.”9 
Next Rauh introduced the Tougaloo College Chaplain Edwin King, vice-
chairman of the Freedom Party, one of four white delegates in the Freedom Party and 
one of two white delegates to testify. A native Mississippian, Chaplain sat before the 
committee and cameras. Above his suit and tie, severe scars crawled up his neck and 
around his face. Brutalized by police, KKK members and other southern racists for his 
participation in civil rights activities, King’s face testified of the injustices in 
Mississippi.  
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His speech was well-crafted, though significantly shorter than Henry’s testimony, 
and outlined the fringe-nature of Mississippi politics and values. He explained that there 
would be more whites involved in this cause if not for the fact that any who did 
inevitably faced social ostracism, loss of jobs and death threats. He testified to his own 
experience volunteering with a voter registration rally, and how he was almost killed on 
the way home by a carload of white men, an act which the police ignored. Well-spoken, 
the Chaplin concluded, “When we have free elections in Mississippi. . .we will join the 
mainstream, we will reject the extremism which has charred the beautiful name of 
Mississippi.”10 King’s description of a “charred Mississippi” alluded to the charred 
vehicle of the three murdered volunteers. Interestingly enough, the very next day 
protestors would gather outside the convention hall in support of the Freedom Party, 
singing songs with Hamer and displaying powerful images—probably the most powerful 
of these was a “replica of a charred Ford station wagon, delivered by a flatbed truck 
from Mississippi; three poles beside it bore photographs of James Cheney, Andrew 
Goodman, and Michael Schwerner.”11 
Before Rauh could introduce his next witness, Governor Lawrence interrupted. 
He objected to the emphasis of the testimonies on the “general life of the state of 
Mississippi,” noting that it would save time if the speakers could confine their 
testimonies to “the question of the election machinery and so forth.”12 Rauh defended 
the subject of his witnesses, noting that their experiences are critical to the case. He then 
called Fannie Lou Hamer. Hamer’s testimony was labeled the most dramatic of 
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testimonies at the Committee hearing that day, and allegedly provoked an emergency 
impromptu televised speech by Johnson.13 
 The third to testify on behalf of the Freedom Party, forty-six year old Hamer 
slowly approached the witness table, walking with a slight limp from either a childhood 
bout with polio or an accident that had occurred in her youth. The two-hundred pound 
black woman was dressed in a dark-colored floral-printed dress, purse in hand. Bernice 
Johnson Reagon, a Freedom Singer and later a SNCC field secretary, remarked that 
Hamer “looked like all the black women I knew . . .she was hefty, she was short, she had 
a signing voice much like the women who came out of our church. . .she looked like a 
real regular.”14 Hamer’s testimony exemplifies a rhetorical strategy that toggles between 
traditional political convention rhetorical form and an evolving, black rhetorical form, 
which I will explain in the next chapter. Because of this, and because her testimony was 
labeled as the most dramatic of all of the testimonies that day, her testimony warrants a 
full, direct quotation. What follows is Hamer’s testimony. 
Mr. Chairman, and the Credentials Committee, my name is Mrs. Fanny Lou 
Hamer, and I live at 626 East Lafayette Street, Ruleville, Mississippi, Sunflower 
County, the home of Senator James O. Eastland, and Senator Stennis.  
It was the 31st of August in 1962 that 18 of us traveled 26 miles to the county 
courthouse in Indianola to try to register to try to become first-class citizens. 
We was met in Indianola by Mississippi men, Highway Patrolmens and they only 
allowed two of us in to take the literacy test at the time. After we had taken this 
test and started back to Ruleville, we was held up by the City Police and the State 
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Highway Patrolmen and carried back to Indianola where the bus driver was 
charged that day with driving a bus the wrong color. 
After we paid the fine among us, we continued on to Ruleville, and Reverend 
Jeff Sunny carried me four miles in the rural areas where I had worked as a 
timekeeper and sharecropper for 18 years. I was met there by my children, who 
told me the plantation owner was angry because I had gone down to try to 
register. 
After they told me, my husband came, and said the plantation owner was raising 
Cain because I had tried to register, and before he quit talking the plantation 
owner came, and said, "Fanny Lou, do you know--did Pap tell you what I said?"  
And I said, "Yes, sir."  
He said, "I mean that, he said, "If you don't go down and withdraw your 
registration, you will have to leave," said, "Then if you go down and withdraw," 
he said, you will--you might have to go because we are not ready for that in 
Mississippi. 
And I addressed him and told him and said "I didn't try to register for you. I tried 
to register for myself." 
I had to leave that same night.  
On the 10th of September 1962, 16 bullets was fired into the home of Mr. And 
Mrs. Robert Tucker for me.15 That same night two girls were shot in Rulesville, 
Mississippi. Also, Mr. Joe McDonald's house was shot in. 
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And in June the 9th, 1963, I had attended a voter registration workshop, was 
returning back to Mississippi. Ten of us was traveling by the Continental 
Trailway bus. When we got to Winona, Mississippi, which is Montgomery 
County, four of the people got off to use the washroom, and two of the people--to 
use the restaurant--two of the people wanted to use the washroom. 
The four people that had gone in to use the restaurant was ordered out. During 
this time I was on the bus. But when I looked through the window and saw they 
had rushed out I got off the bus to see what had happened, and one of the ladies 
said, "it was a State Highway Patrolman and a Chief Justice of Police ordered us 
out." 
I got back on the bus and one of the persons had used the washroom got back on 
the bus, too. 
As soon as I was seated on the bus, I saw when they began to get the four people 
in a highway patrolman's car, I stepped off of the bus to see what was happening 
and somebody screamed from the car that the four workers was in and said, "Get 
that one there, and when I went to get in the car, when the man told me I was 
under arrest, he kicked me. 
I was carried to the county jail, and put in the booking room. They left some of 
the people in the booking room and began to place us in cells. I was placed in a 
cell with a young woman called Miss Ivesta Simpson. After I was laced in the 
cell I began to hear sounds of licks and screams. I could hear the sounds of licks 
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and horrible screams, and I could hear somebody say, "Can you say, yes, sir, 
nigger? Can you say yes, sir?" 
And they would say other horrible names. 
She would say, "Yes, I can say yes, sir." 
"So say it." 
She says, "I don't know you well enough." 
They beat her, I don't know how long, and after a while she began to pray, and 
asked God to have mercy on these people. 
And it wasn't long before three white men came to my cell. One of these men 
was a State Highway Patrolman and he asked me where I was from, and I told 
him Ruleville, and he said, "We are going to check this." 
And they left my cell and it wasn't too long before they came back. He said, 
"You are from Ruleville all right," and he used a curse word, and he said, "We 
are going to make you wish you was dead." 
I was carried out of that cell into another cell where they had two Negro 
prisoners. The State Highway Patrolmen order the first Negro to take the 
blackjack. The first Negro prisoner ordered me, by orders from the State 
Highway Patrolman for me, to lay on a bunk bed on my face, and I laid on my 
face. The first Negro began to beat, and I was beat by the first Negro until he was 
exhausted, and I was holding my hands behind me at that time on my left side 
because I suffered from polio when I was six years old. After the first Negro had 
beat me until he was exhausted the State Highway Patrolman ordered the second 
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Negro to take the blackjack. The second Negro began to beat me and I began to 
work my feet, and the State Highway Patrolman ordered the first Negro who had 
beat to set on my feet to keep me from working my feet. I began to scream and 
one white man got up and began to beat in my head and tell me to hush. One 
white man--my dress had worked up high, he walked over and pulled my dress 
down and he pulled my dress back, back up.  
I was in jail when Medgar Evers was murdered.  
All of this on account we want to register, to become first-class citizens, and if 
the freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America, is this 
America, the land of the free and the home of the brave where we have to sleep 
with our telephones off of the hooks because our lives be threatened daily 
because we want to live as decent human beings, in America? 
Thank you. (Applause)16 
When she had finished speaking, someone took off her microphone. Hamer slowly rose, 
took her purse, and walked back to her party’s table. 
Hamer’s testimony had been an account of the facts of her experience trying to 
vote as she remembered them. But her speech was delivered with such emotion, that she 
evoked empathy, if not guilt, from her audience. When she first sat down to speak, her 
boisterous presence commanded almost complete silence from the convention hall. The 
two hundred pound woman was already growing sweaty in her faded floral-print dress. 
As she began to speak, her loud, melodious voice covered any whispering that might 
have been going on between delegates. The rhythm of her speech mimicked that of the 
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preachers from her church—her narrative was broken into segments that had pauses now 
and again as if to demand reflection. Her story climaxed with the statement, “I was in 
jail when Medgar Evers was murdered,” at which point she began to cry.17 By the end of 
her speech, tears had intermingled with sweat. Together, the tears and sweat glistened 
around her eyes, poured down her face, and seemed to cover her entire body. 
According to Lynne Olson, there was a moment of absolute silence.18 Mills notes 
that “some of the seated politicians listening were in tears.” However, Mills also notes 
that “One of the regulars criticized Mrs. Hamer’s testimony, calling it a ‘pitiful story’ 
told by a woman who had, in fact, had a chance to participate in the electoral process.”19 
Whether or not the rest of the nation had responded similarly to Hamer’s testimony was 
not apparent . . . at least, not immediately. 
In truth, the nation did not see Hamer’s speech in its entirety until the network 
news aired it later that evening. The White House had been watching the convention, 
and responded to Hamer’s testimony in particular, with rage. Hamer remembers a man 
present at the testimony who echoed Johnson’s orders to take the camera off of her: 
It was a man there, very close, that told me that he said to get—told them people 
with the cameras to get that goddamn television off them niggers in Mississippi 
and put it back on the convention, because, see, the whole world was hearing too 
much . . . see because, I found out after then women and men from all over the 
country wept when I was testifying—because when I testified, I was crying too.20 
We can infer from the interview that Hamer was emotional during her speech and tape, 
and that she managed to arouse people all over the country—be it in anger or tears. 
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Olson notes that the network stories that aired later that night “led to a deluge of calls 
and telegrams to the Credentials Committee from all over the country in support of the 
Freedom Party challenge.”21 Kotz notes that following the appearance of her testimony 
on the evening news, the White House received another deluge of telegrams and phone 
calls from the nation—all but one in favor of seating the Freedom Democrats.22 This 
time, however, the telegrams were in response to the televised testimonies, not just 
Rauh’s lobbying. Because of the press coverage that hailed Hamer as the most dramatic 
of the testimonies, and because she seems to be the emphasis in historical accounts of 
this credentials committee hearing, it seems reasonable to assume that it was the 
emotional nature of her message that incited these telegrams and phone calls.  
 After Hamer testified, Rauh decided to skip the next witness in the interest of 
time, and called Rita Schwerner to the stand. The pale woman seemed even paler in her 
dark dress. The murder of her husband with the two other Freedom Summer volunteers 
had drained her. Her presence provoked Mr. E.K. Collins, who rose and declared that 
Schwerner was only “being put on for passion and prejudice against the delegates here 
from Mississippi.” Chairman Lawrence responded, “I think we can all rely on the 
members of our committee—they are all capable people—to screen out of the testimony 
any testimony which is important to the issue and particularly applicable to the issue.”23 
Mrs. Schwerner was permitted to testify.  
The small, thin, brunette woman was so pale that her dark dress created the 
illusion that her white skin was glowing. Her words, like her movements, seemed to float 
with purpose, but there was something horribly haunting behind her testimony. She 
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spoke of the disappearance of her husband and her subsequent numerous and 
unsuccessful attempts to speak with Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson. She finished 
her speech by telling the Committee that “no official report” had been released, and that 
she had been unable to obtain her husband’s death certificate from Neshoba County.24 
She left the table, and along with it, the ghost of her plea behind her. 
 As Schwerner returned to the Freedom Party’s table, Rauh passed over another 
witness of “a similar nature” and called Reverend James C. Moore to the stand. 
Reverend Moore, part of the National Council of Churches’ Commission on Religion 
and Race, attested to the legitimacy of the Freedom Party as a representative of all of the 
people in Mississippi. Having worked in Mississippi, he felt that he and the rest of the 
people in his organization had been “at an excellent vantage point from which to witness 
life in Mississippi.” Through his personal experience, he felt confident that the FDP 
would be a “permanent, constructive influence in the life of the State.”25 Reverend 
Moore’s testimony was followed by three more: James Farmer, Roy Wilkins and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.  
 The Freedom Party Chairman rose and walked to the table where he would 
testify. Behind the microphone, Farmer sat in a suit and tie. His rich voice poured out 
over the audience as he began to compare the historical positions of the Freedom Party 
and the Underground Railroad. He stated, “[The MFDP] is not underground, it is above 
ground and it is not seeking to lead people out of the South and some place else. It is 
seeking to lead them into the heart of the Nation and the mainspring and mainstream of 
the Democratic Party and of this Nation.” His speech appealed to the loyalty of the 
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Democrats—if they wanted to be true to their party’s platform, there was no question 
which Mississippi group should be seated. Farmer’s testimony was followed by that of 
Roy Wilkins. 
Like the other male members of the Freedom Delegates who testified, Wilkins 
appeared before the committee and the television cameras in a suit and tie. Tall and 
slender, he sat before the public and cut straight to the point. His speech was brief and 
made a direct appeal to the committee members. He propositioned them, 
Ladies and gentlemen, you come from political districts, you come from 
precincts, you come from counties, you come from states, and you know that you 
would not tolerate a situation in your state where forty-two percent of the 
population had no voice. I ask you from Iowa, Nebraska, and Wyoming and 
Michigan and Indiana, and yes, from Georgia and from Louisiana—I ask you 
here to apply that political rule, and I ask something else. I ask that you apply the 
higher rule than political rule, the rule of morality.26 
Like Hamer, Wilkins evoked a moral power which crescendoed with his concluding 
commentary on the state of affairs in the United States. He begged his audience, “I ask 
you to remember that this Nation was founded upon the declaration that Government is 
by consent of the governed, and that we fought a war with England, a hopeless war, they 
said, because they had no representative in the English Parliament.”27 Wilkins appealed 
to the nation’s founding principles and the ideals the founders fought so vigilantly for all 
those years ago. 
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 The final Freedom Delegate to testify was no stranger to the national scene. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. took the stand and continued to build what would become a 
rhetorical legacy. Mills notes  
Although he knew Goldwater might try to exploit the white backlash, King felt 
that some satisfactory adjustment to the Freedom Party issue had to be found or 
there might be even more racial protests that could hurt Johnson’s prospects in 
November. He thought black votes could make a difference in a few states, 
especially Georgia and Tennessee, but if black voters felt the election was 
irrelevant, they might stay at home.28 
King’s presence at the hearing gave the Freedom Party’s case an added power and 
legitimation that would otherwise have been missing. No longer was the party just a 
bunch of unknown insurgents; they were civil rights activists who worked with Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Furthermore, King was recognized as someone who worked through the 
system, as opposed to engaging in violent methods of change. So there was no need to 
fear the Freedom Party; it must be comprised of assimilationists. His ethos already 
firmly established by public appearances such as the March on Washington and the 
signing of the Civil Rights Act, King’s presence at the end of the testimonies reaffirmed 
the legitimacy and power of the Freedom Party as a civil rights organization.  
Eloquent and poetic, King’s argument focused on persuading the Democrats that 
their party platform was endangered by the defiance of their Mississippi delegates. He 
said, “No state in the Union is as extreme in its racism as Mississippi.”29 He accused 
Mississippi of “making a mockery of the Democratic process,” and pointed out that the 
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Mississippi regulars had already “pledged to defy the platform of this great national 
party.” He told the committee that if they were to seat the Freedom Party, they would be 
giving the symbolic promise “of the intention of this country to bring freedom and 
democracy to all people.” King’s appeal to the committee demonstrates an acute 
awareness of the power in the symbolic act of representing the state of Mississippi. It is 
through the symbolic representation of a state—the ability to define reality for a state—
that power shifts from symbolic to real.  
At the conclusion of King’s testimony, the challengers rested. The regulars were 
given an opportunity to refute the arguments made by Rauh and those that testified on 
behalf of the Freedom Party. Mr. Collins began his rebuttal by comparing the “so-called 
Freedom Democratic Party” to the Ku Klux Klan, observing that both organizations kept 
“their delegations or their rolls secret.” He argued, “No we would [not let the Freedom 
Democratic Party be seated] . . . because they are illegal, illegally constituted, the same 
as the KKK.” Furthermore, Collins declared, “they represent no one.”30 His argument 
was simple: the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party was not legally registered.  
 Rauh, who had to argue to use the fifteen minutes he saved during his allotted 
hour of testimonies for a rebuttal to Collins’s argument, said that the FDP would gladly 
turn over their roll to the credentials committee, but not to the Mississippi regulars. Rauh 
refuted the claim that the Freedom Party was not legally registered. In fact, he pointed 
out the Freedom Party was a legal party. He continued, “You can’t follow the laws of 
Mississippi if you are a Negro. The laws are made to throw Negroes out of every right in 
Mississippi. All you can do in a legal way is to do the best you can.” He argued that the 
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FDP could not even hold a meeting in more than thirty-five counties because people 
were scared for their lives. Rauh proceeded to point out all of the past incidences when 
the Mississippi Democratic regulars rejected the National Party’s nominees and general 
platform. He quoted Governor Johnson as having said, “Our MDP is entirely free and 
independent of the influence or domination of any national party,” and “My 
determination is to do anything I can to get the Kennedy dynasty out of the White 
House.” According to Rauh, if the FDP was not seated, history would be repeating 
itself.31  
The waves swelled. In the immediate aftermath of the testimonies, the nation was 
caught up in the tide of emotion, the Democratic Party was caught up in the tide of moral 
responsibility and the Credentials Committee was stuck in the riptide of legalities. It 
seemed as though the whole country was left questioning itself, its morals, its laws, its 
ideals and values. As the days passed, however, the Mississippi challenge became an 
undercurrent during the political happenings of the rest of the 1964 Democratic National 
Convention.  
Before recounting those events, however, it is important first to look closer at the 
rhetorical crisis that occurred on the floor at the Credentials Committee hearing. As 
Bitzer said, once the orator engages in the rhetorical situation, “both he and his speech 
are additional constituents.”32 Now that the testimonies have been introduced to the 
rhetorical situation, the next chapter will explore how these testimonies became 
“additional constituents.” After all, it is the rhetorical interplay in the specific context of 
the Committee, the subsequent political bargaining behind the scenes during the next 
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four days of the convention, and the exigence that evolved as a result of this bargaining 
that illuminate the symbolic power and limitations behind a rhetoric aimed at redefining 
race in the nation’s social and political consciousness. 
As I previously stated, Hamer’s testimony elicited the most response from the 
Democrats as well as from the public. Identified as a leader in the Freedom Party, 
remembered as the “most dramatic” by the public, and singled out as “the” troublemaker 
by Johnson and the regulars, Hamer embodies the rhetorical crisis at the convention. It 
was her testimony that made the audience feel the urgency of the situation. It was her 
testimony that conveyed the idea that a promise of future reform was no longer good 
enough; the Freedom Party must be seated now. Hence, the following chapter is devoted 
to a close reading of her testimony. Chapter III chapter suggests that Hamer was both 
empowered and constrained by her rhetorical strategies. This Chapter also suggests that 
her strategies enabled her, and consequently the Freedom Party, to transcend the 
symbolic power of the Democratic Party. Yet simultaneously, these strategies confined 











If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet 
depreciate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want 
rain without thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its 
many waters. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. 
–Frederick Douglass, 1857 
 
When the testimonies from the Mississippi Freedom Delegates aired the evening 
of August 22nd, an entire nation was swept up in a wave of sympathy of the protestors’ 
plight. Over the next few days, however, any current of national concern seemed to 
recede from the shorefront; only remnants remained—an editorial piece here, a picture 
of the Freedom Singers there, or an interview with Aaron Henry on television, in which 
he espoused support of presidential nominee Johnson and offered his organization’s 
efforts in the presidential race. In the wake of presidential and vice-presidential 
nominations, a moving speech by Robert Kennedy, and convention-business-as-usual, 
the hopes of the Freedom Delegates had been washed out to sea. The rhetorical crisis 
that accumulated on Saturday, August 22nd, had dissipated by Monday, August 24th. Yet 
despite its brevity, this rhetorical crisis highlights the constraints imposed on the 
rhetorical form employed by the Freedom Party in this given context.  
It seems apparent that the most controversial speaker in this rhetorical situation 
was Fannie Lou Hamer. The immediate impact of her testimony seemed to gain power 
for the Freedom Party and fuel the crisis for the Democrats. As will be explored in 
Chapter IV, however, the Democrats retaliated with a rhetorical strategy that resolved 
the crisis in their favor, and Hamer’s power vanished. Because this thesis seeks to 
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understand the rhetorical crisis in this situation, it makes sense to focus on the testimony 
that established the urgency of the situation most clearly, and that most embodied the 
rhetorical power of the Freedom Party. It is through that testimony that the rhetorical 
constraints of the Party emerge. Hence, this chapter offers a close reading of Hamer’s 
testimony in an attempt to understand the development and eventual resolution of the 
rhetorical crisis that occurred at the Credentials Committee hearing. By unveiling 
Hamer’s rhetorical strategies—her ability to toggle between rhetorical forms, embody 
symbolic power, and enact moral authority—I hope to illuminate the reasons that the 
rhetorical crisis developed as it did.  
There existed a rhetorical crisis in the very presence of protest rhetoric at the 
convention, but this crisis was magnified by the tensions between a traditional protest 
rhetoric and an evolving black protest rhetoric. In other words, the sixties were a 
tumultuous time in history when the fight for equality reached another peak in United 
States history. The protest rhetoric of blacks had been evolving for many years. In an 
effort to gain the symbolic power needed to redefine race, racism and race relations in 
America, black rhetoric evolved. Different black rhetoricians explored different 
rhetorical strategies; some linked their rhetoric to the white abolitionist movement, some 
defied this, others engaged in managerial rhetoric while still others explored 
confrontational rhetoric.1 By the time of the convention, the public had seen, at least on 
their television sets, speakers like Martin Luther King, Bayard Rustin, Bob Moses and 
Aaron Henry. But there had been limited exposure in the media of speakers like Fannie 
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Lou Hamer. Perhaps it is best to pause here and reflect upon the woman and the rhetor of 
Fannie Lou Hamer. 
On October 6, 1917, Hamer was born into sharecropping and the on-going 
exploitation of her race. Eventually, Hamer would break away from the Old South. She 
was swept up by the Civil Rights Movement, in time becoming a prominent leader for 
the cause, paving the way for the black vote in the South, running unsuccessfully for 
several political positions,2 and later in life, founding multiple social organizations 
benefiting economically struggling blacks.3 Biographies of, interviews with and stories 
about Hamer all illustrate the effect of her voice not only on the Civil Rights Movement, 
but also on the integrity of blacks for generations to come.  
Hamer was introduced to civil rights when Freedom Summer reached her 
hometown of Ruleville. In a 1972 interview with historian Dr. Neil McMillen, Hamer 
recalls the exact moment she learned about her rights. She was at the Williams Chapel 
Church. She recalls, 
One night I went to the church. They had this mass meeting. And I went to the 
church, and they talked about how it was our right, and that we could register and 
vote. . . That sounded interesting enough to me that I wanted to try it. I had never 
heard, until 1962, that black people could register and vote.4 
Hamer, inspired by the words of Bob Moses and Jim Foreman, set out to vote. It would 
take her three tries before she actually was able to register. The first time she had to take 
a literacy test, which was to copy down verbatim and then interpret the sixteenth section 
of the Constitution of Mississippi. Hamer had no idea what it was, so she failed and was 
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arrested. The second time was a failed attempt as the police made her go back home. Her 
landowner greeted her return by firing her. The third time, SNCC had prepared her for 
the interpretive part of the literacy test, so she passed. When she went to cast her ballot, 
however, she was informed that she could not vote because she had not been paying a 
poll tax for the legally required length of two years.5 
 Fired from the plantation and inspired by the right to vote, Hamer became a civil 
rights worker, first for SNCC and then for Council of Federated Organizations. She 
traveled around with the organizations, educating blacks about voter registration. Having 
acquired only up to a sixth grade level of education, Hamer versed herself in the legal 
and political issues through the organizations. It was in her travels that Hamer 
experienced the fateful bus ride that would lead to her imprisonment and violent beating 
at the hands of Mississippi police officers. This event became the subject of Hamer’s 
most powerful speech—her testimony before the Credentials Committee at the 1964 
Democratic Party.  
Hamer’s rhetoric is the very evidence of an evolving black rhetoric. Even back to 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, black women in particular struggled to 
give voice to their reality. Socially, economically and politically beneath not only white 
men, but white woman as well, black women struggled to be heard, let alone represented 
in the civil rights movement. When Hamer stood before the one-hundred and ten 
credential committee members, the television cameras and the press, she represented not 
just blacks, but black, female, sharecroppers. She was at the bottom of the bottom of the 
social, economic and political ladder. Her testimony, nay her very presence, drew 
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attention to the varying degrees of  black rhetoric, black female rhetoric, and the stark 
contrast of this rhetoric in the traditional white political context that she found herself in.  
Hence the struggle between rhetorical forms within the Freedom Party can be 
understood not only by analyzing the rhetorical form of protest in a context of traditional 
convention form, but also by analyzing the impact of the evolving black, and particularly 
black female, rhetorical form in a context of traditional white, male rhetorical form. 
Building on Campbell’s definition of form from Chapter I, then, it seems useful and 
necessary to introduce this concept of an evolving black female rhetorical form. To do 
this requires another look at Campbell’s work. In an article entitled “Style and Content 
in the Rhetoric of Early Afro-American Feminists,” Karlyn Kohrs Campbell outlines the 
similarities and differences of rhetorical forms between traditional women abolitionists 
and black women abolitionists.6 She presents a juxtaposition of early “Afro-American” 
rhetoric and the tradition of early white women’s rhetoric in the time period of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Afro-American women, Campbell writes, were confronted with many of the 
same problems of white women. Yet there were political and social divides between the 
two groups—the most obvious divide was that most white female abolitionists did not 
have to confront the combined problem of sexism and racism, and were more than likely 
racist themselves. According to Campbell, these divides forced Afro-American women 
to “converge and diverge” from the rhetorical strategies employed by their “white 
counterparts.” Hence, black women toggled between adherence to this “traditional 
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feminine style” and the development of their own rhetorical style in as “Afro-American” 
women in the public sphere.7  
As a point of comparison and in order to understand one dimension of the 
evolving Afro-American rhetorical form, Campbell offers a definition of this idea of a 
“traditional feminine style.” She notes that “like their white counterparts, Afro-American 
women frequently made use of the ‘feminine’ style in addressing other women or in 
adapting to white and/or male audiences.”8 She writes that 
Structurally, “feminine” rhetoric is inductive, even circuitous, moving from 
example to example, and is usually grounded in personal experience. In most 
instances, personal experience is tested against the pronouncements of male 
authorities (who can be used for making accusations and indictments that would 
be impermissible from a woman) and buttressed by limited amounts of statistical 
evidence demonstrating that personal experience is not atypical. Because of their 
“natural piety,” women may appeal to biblical authority. Metaphors and 
figurative analogies are frequently used. Consistent with their allegedly poetic 
and emotional natures, women tend to adopt associative, dramatic, and narrative 
modes of development, as opposed to deductive forms of organization. The tone 
tends to be personal and somewhat tentative, rather than objective or 
authoritative. The persona tends to be traditionally feminine, like that of teacher, 
mediator, or layperson, rather than that of expert, leader, preacher, or judge. 
Strategically, women who use this style will seek ways to reconcile femininity 
with the traditional “masculinity” of public discourse. A “womanly” speaker 
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tends to plead, to appeal to the sentiments of the audience, to “court” the 
audience by being “seductive.”9 
Campbell continues,  
While peculiarly adapted to the conditions of women, this mode of discourse is 
suitable for both male and female audiences. The style that is “feminine” has 
many of the characteristics of the “consciousness raising” that have been a 
central part of the contemporary feminism. Generally, women have perceived 
themselves in ways that precluded them from functioning as audiences or agents 
of change.10   
The traditional feminine style of protest, then, embodies traditional feminine 
characteristics.  
To illustrate how many black women converged to and diverged from this 
traditional feminine form of rhetoric, Campbell studies the speeches of Sojourner Truth, 
Ida B. Wells and Mary Church Terrell.  Her analysis of fragments of speeches given by 
Sojourner Truth reveals that like her “white counterparts,” Truth “relied on biblical 
authority, personal experience, vivid metaphors, and the power of herself as 
enactment.”11 Campbell’s article touches only briefly on the ways in which Truth 
distinguishes herself from early white abolitionist rhetoric.  
It should be noted, however, that Truth defied many qualities of the rhetorical 
strategies of her white counterparts. In her speech “Ain’t I A Woman,” Truth 
demonstrates the reality that while she is a woman, and she is capable and successful at 
employing the qualities of traditional feminine rhetoric, she is treated as anything but a 
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woman. Her children were sold off like cattle, she did the physical labor of a man day in 
and day out, and she was never lifted over mud puddles or helped into carriages. She 
was a woman, but she was not treated like a woman. By making such a statement, Truth 
defied social concepts of “femininity.”  Many black feminist theorists argue that in doing 
so, Truth deconstructed traditional concepts of femininity and womanhood. So while it is 
evident that Truth was capable of appealing to and using some of the qualities labeled 
traditional feminine form—biblical authority, personal story and vivid metaphors—
Truth embodied the idea that she was not being treated as a woman. This illustrates one 
way in which black women converged to and diverged from traditional feminine rhetoric 
in the public sphere.   
However black women chose to speak before the public, they always did so in a 
context dominated by white men. Many rhetorical strategies and forms would converge 
to and diverge from appeals to this particular context, this particular audience. Campbell 
introduces Mary Church Terrell’s 1906 speech, “What It Means to Be Colored in the 
Capital of the United States.” This speech, Campbell points out, “is a sharp reminder of 
the gulf between Afro-American and white women.” Her speech evaded any appeals to a 
white, male audience, and instead focused on an appeal to higher ideals shared by the 
society. Her speech was “an attempt to make whites understand just what it was to be 
Afro-American, particularly Afro-American woman, in the nation’s capital, that symbol 
of national values,” and illustrated “the experiences of Afro-Americans [as] proof of the 
gap between America’s proclaimed principles and their application to those with ‘a fatal 
drop of African blood . . . percolating somewhere through [their] veins.’”  
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Campbell’s analysis offers an avenue for a critique for what happened at the 
1964 Democratic National Convention. Fannie Lou Hamer, then, emerges as the most 
defiant of traditional convention rhetoric, and most notable in this struggle between 
“traditional feminine rhetoric” and the Afro-American rhetoric that Sojourner Truth and 
subsequent women like Mary Church Terrell had begun to define centuries earlier. 
Because Hamer’s rhetorical form breached the well-established, traditional convention 
rhetoric and toggled between “traditional feminine rhetoric” and an evolving black 
rhetoric, the nation identified her as the “most dramatic” of the testifiers.12 She was not 
someone and her rhetoric was not something that the public expected in this traditional 
context, and that made her testimony shocking, even though it was not new to the public 
scene. 
Traditional convention rhetoric embodied traditionally masculine form because it 
existed in a context that was predominately male-dominated. Hamer was in stark 
contrast to traditional convention rhetoric. Her rhetorical abilities and mere presence 
deviated from the traditionally masculine form of convention rhetoric. The forty-six year 
old, two-hundred pound, black female sharecropper was a shocking visual on the 
television set. Her faded, floral-printed dress, her limp, even her diction, was out of place 
in a room full of white, male politicians. Unlike her fellow Freedom delegates—
predominantly black men adhering in both physical appearance and rhetorical strategy to 
the traditional convention form—Hamer did not employ strategic organization or lay out 
carefully crafted arguments for why the Mississippi regulars should be unseated and 
replaced by the Freedom delegates. As opposed to Henry’s presentation of statistics in 
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Mississippi to King’s historical summary of the discrepancies between the Mississippi 
Democratic Party and the National Democratic Party, Hamer’s only argument was 
deduced from the horrific tragedy of her personal experience trying to vote. Employing 
“traditional feminine rhetoric,” Hamer narrated her own personal experience attempting 
to vote.  
Hamer toggled between this “traditional feminine rhetoric” and her own evolving 
rhetoric of a black woman. Eleanor Holmes Norton, “who heard virtually all of the civil 
rights orators, maintained that Fannie Lou Hamer may have had no equal, save only Dr. 
King.”13 But why? Hamer was not eloquent in the sense that she possessed a strong 
command of the language. Her diction reflected six years of on-again-off-again 
schooling, as she missed most days to tend the land with her family. She had a few 
workshops at the Highlander Folk School, but her public speaking experience was 
limited to small groups of people when she traveled around and attempted to register 
black voters. 
 Hamer’s very lack of formal education disposed her manner of speaking 
favorably to a paternalistic public. Mike Thelwell, a SNCC organizer, remembers that 
Hamer’s “unlettered voice gave her words a power that no amount of grammatical 
correctness could have infused.” She did not use a grand style or create strategic 
arguments. Yet it was this grammatically incorrect style that infused the Freedom Party’s 
case that day with strategy.  
Her language was simple and direct—perhaps best described as rustic. But 
Hamer’s image and words connected with what the majority of the nation labeled as a 
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black, female sharecropper. With a voice that evoked memories or images in the minds 
of her audience members of the sounds of biblical hymns in a Southern church, Hamer’s 
testimony identified with the stereotypes that the nation was expecting from a person 
from this economic, social and racial class. Hamer testified along side Civil Rights 
leaders like the logical and articulate Aaron Henry and the passionate and poetic Martin 
Luther King. 
Structurally, much of her testimony appealed to the traditional feminine 
rhetorical form. She presented a narrative of the brutal beatings that she endured on June 
9, 1963. She told a story. She told her story. The structure of her testimony shadowed 
the requirements of the traditional feminine rhetoric, as it moved “from example to 
example,” and was “grounded in personal experience.” Yet like Truth, Hamer’s speech 
defied traditional feminine rhetoric; she was a woman and employed feminine form, but 
the world was not treating her as a woman. This fact made her rhetoric diverge from 
traditional feminine form, and draw attention to this divergence.  
Her testimony evaded any use of statistical evidence in order to “demonstrate 
that personal experience is not atypical,” but Hamer used evidence. 14 Her story told the 
facts as she remembered them. While her presentation gave the testimony an emotional 
nature, the majority of her statement was the recollection of a series of events as they 
happened. Hamer’s testimony, then, simultaneously converges to and diverges from 
traditional feminine form. 
Through the details of the events leading up to and then throughout the 
imprisonment, Hamer evoked vivid imagery of the violence of that day and led the 
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audience through a dramatic plot. This plot follows the prescribed traditional from of 
rhetoric. Campbell writes, “Consistent with their allegedly poetic and emotional natures, 
women tend to adopt associative, dramatic, and narrative modes of development, as 
opposed to deductive forms of organization.”15 Framing the civil rights workers as 
victims and the Patrolmen as villains, Hamer also adopts another characteristic of 
traditional rhetoric: she strategically personalizes the parts of the story to which she 
wants the audience to relate. She doesn’t detail the faces or tones of the Highway 
Patrolmen. Instead, they remain so cruel and distant that they appear machine-like. The 
pain experienced by the civil rights workers, on the other hand, was disturbingly 
descriptive. She repeatedly refers to the “sounds of licks and screams” from her fellow 
civil rights workers. In the most detail, she describes her own beating—the two black 
mean beating her until they were exhausted, her own efforts to protect her left side that 
was weakened from polio. . .on and on. 
Her choices of what information and details to include and which ones not to 
include impacted the way her message was received. In a sense, by choosing not to focus 
on the way the patrolmen looked, or the specific way they spoke (albeit the description 
of their crude, foul-mouthed manner), Hamer denies them their humanity, and 
demonizes them. While obviously the patrolmen were acting inhumanely toward Hamer 
and the civil rights workers, there were those in her audience who would not 
automatically feel sympathy with her plight, but instead feel that she got what “any 
Negro ought to get.” By choosing to focus on the pain of others and herself, she 
addresses the varying degrees of moods that her diverse audience is in, and seeks to have 
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them all understand her feelings on the issue. Listeners could not help but be captivated 
by her story, to move with her emotionally through what the New York Times describes 
as “outrage to resignation to hope.”16 Her narrative forces listeners to imagine the 
trauma—to experience it with her. 
Furthermore, Hamer employed traditional feminine rhetoric along with the 
nation’s paternalistic attitude toward black women to establish a moral authority. She 
invokes notions of martyrdom, recalling hearing the prayer of a woman, asking God not 
to save herself, but to have mercy on the officers. Appealing to the Christian values of 
her audience, Hamer describes the prayer of the woman being beaten to death in a 
nearby cell. Alluding the woman to Christ, Hamer states, “They beat her, I don’t know 
how long, and after awhile she began to pray, and asked God to have mercy on these 
people.”17 This is a Biblical appeal to Luke 23:24, which states, “Then said Jesus, 
Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.”18 It is crucial to emphasize that 
Hamer demonstrated that the black woman had more moral power and righteousness 
than the white men. 
This moral power within Hamer’s rhetoric extends further, culminating at the end 
of the testimony in what possibly is Hamer’s strongest appeal—toward the political and 
social consciousness. She questions the Democratic Party’s adherence to its espoused 
platform. She questions the discrepancy between law and practice. She appeals to the 
Constitutional right of freedom and America’s concept of a citizen. Her final paragraph 
illustrates her exceptional and heroic testimony, and warrants another full, direct 
quotation: 
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All of this on account we want to register, to become first class citizens. And if 
the Freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America. Is this 
America the land of the free and the home of the brave where we have to sleep 
with our telephones off the hooks because our lives be threatened daily because 
we want to live as decent human beings in America?19 
By employing several key characteristics of traditional feminine rhetoric, Hamer was 
able to develop her ethos into the traditional, paternalistic context in which she spoke. 
But by diverging from traditional feminine rhetoric—her personal story documented the 
fact that there were major inconsistencies between law and practice—Hamer was able to 
shock her audience and establish legal as well as moral legitimacy. 
Well-known for what the New York Times described as a “husky, powerful 
voice,” Hamer’s voice and presence evoked images of cotton fields covered in 
unbearable heat, cooled by the biblical hymns sung by slaves. When Reagon recalled 
that Hamer “looked like all the black women I knew . . .she was hefty, she was short, she 
had a signing voice much like the women who came out of our church. . .she looked like 
a real regular,” Reagon highlighted the fact that Hamer embodied, in physical 
appearance and rhetorical style, what white America considered to be a “real regular 
black person.”20 Yet although Hamer looked “real regular,” she was far more than 
regular. Her station in life lent her to the stereotypes. Her presence, albeit shocking in 
the formal political arena that was dominated by white upper-class men, appealed to the 
paternalistic, and consequently racist, feelings that the majority of the public held toward 
a black, female sharecropper.  
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Why had she been chosen? Was it just chance that this particular black female 
sharecropper had been selected to speak before the entire nation? Hamer added to the 
strategy of the Freedom Party. She defied traditional convention rhetoric and employed 
traditional feminine rhetoric only to establish a connection with the audience. After that, 
her testimony explored the evolving rhetoric of black women, reaching to redefine 
reality for the rest of the country. Hamer was exceptional and charismatic—a leader 
capable of utilizing her rhetoric to reflect a reality that the majority of the nation had not 
been willing to see before. This was precisely why Hamer had been chosen to represent 
the Freedom Party at the Credentials Committee.  
Hamer offered something to the power of the Freedom Party’s rhetoric that the 
others who testified could not. The only other female to testify on behalf of the Freedom 
Party was Rita Schwerner, whose husband had been one of the three volunteers that 
captured the nation’s attention with their disappearance and subsequent discovery, 
murdered during Freedom Summer.  
Schwerner was the exact opposite of Hamer, both physically and rhetorically. 
She was white, thin and frail looking. Her speech was short and without an emotional 
appeal. She stuck to the facts of her husband’s death, her failed attempts to speak with 
Governor Wallace and her inability to obtain her husband’s death certificate from 
Neshoba County.  Schwerner’s rhetoric was not entirely without traditional feminine 
form, as she appealed to the white, male audience. Her words appealed to conscience of 
her audience, though she never directly stated a course of action or offered a definitive 
statement of morality. Instead, her use of examples of her experience with Governor 
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Wallace framed her rhetoric as submissively circuitous. Because Schwerner’s speech 
embodied some of the forms of traditionally feminine rhetoric, her presence did not 
shock or threaten the convention or the national audience. Hamer, on the hand, shocked 
and threatened the convention.  
Although she did incorporate some of the traditional feminine form into her 
testimony, Hamer transcended this genre in the same utterance that she transcended the 
convention genre. Her identity as a woman lent her rhetoric to a dramatic, narrative 
mode of development, grounded in personal experience and seeded with “consciousness-
raising” appeals. But Hamer was not appealing to a male, white audience, nor was she 
appealing in a submissive manner. Her physical presence defied such an appeal. Her 
weight and stature conveyed strength and pride. Her “husky, powerful voice” 
commanded attention.21 In truth, when Reagon remarked that Hamer “looked like all the 
black women [she] knew . . . she was hefty, she was short, she had a singing voice much 
like the women who came out of [a Southern] church . . . she didn’t look like [a] teacher; 
she looked like the usher on the usher board . . . she looked real regular,” Reagon offered 
a snapshot not just of how the nation saw Hamer, but how the nation understood 
Hamer.22  
 This introduces an important rhetorical form ingrained in Hamer’s every word. 
Hamer gained more attention and was more effective than the other Freedom Delegates 
not just because she defied traditional convention rhetoric, or because she toggled 
between traditional feminine rhetoric and black rhetoric, but because she exhibited a 
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rhetorical form called “enactment.” The idea of enactment presents an important point in 
understanding the rhetorical crisis between the Freedom Party and the Democratic Party.  
According to Campbell and Jamieson, “enactment” occurs when “the speaker 
incarnates the argument, is the proof of the truth of what is said.”23 Campbell uses 
Sojourner Truth as an example of the power of the rhetorical form of enactment because 
Truth embodied the discrepancies between societal concepts of “femininity” and the 
reality of a poor, slave woman.24 In her article with Jamieson, Campbell introduces 
Representative Barbara Jordan of Texas as enactment at the 1976 Democratic 
Convention. Jordan acknowledges her reflexive form when she says, “And I feel that, 
notwithstanding the past, my presence here is one additional piece of evidence that the 
American dream need not forever be deferred.”25 As a woman, and more particularly as 
a black woman, Jordan embodied her argument that the espoused American dream can 
come true for every body. 
 Similarly, Hamer embodies her argument. Listen to her trials and tribulations as 
she attempted to claim the espoused right to vote—the democratic process is not 
working. Listen to her horrific experience in jail—the Constitution is failing. This 
rhetorical form was often employed by women who were socially or economically 
restricted from engaging in the deductive arguments of white men. Hamer was just a 
sharecropper to these politicians. She was a woman. She was a black woman. Her 
knowledge of statistical evidence and facts was minimal, and would have been belittled 
and scoffed at by the white politicians had she attempted to engage them in it. But she 
did engage in factual evidence. Through her personal narrative—classified as traditional 
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feminine form—Hamer presented a knowledge of facts that when said out loud, before 
the entire nation, shocked the white politicians.  
Hamer’s ability to enact her argument surpasses the fact that she was her own 
evidence. Hamer also enacted the role of a “real regular black woman,” and then used 
this role to shock the nation by presenting herself as so much more. In the simplicity of 
her sentences, she came across as being honest and sincere; fulfilling that expectation of 
how a woman, and even more so how a “real regular black woman,” would speak and 
act. She fulfilled the expectations of maintaining a sincere style and an emotional 
commitment to her delivery. Mills notes that Hamer had an “ability to capture the 
essence of the struggle in Mississippi in compelling language that all could 
understand.”26 Her conversational tone spoke to the committee members as if they were 
friends and neighbors. Through this appeal—because Hamer was what the nation 
expected a black woman to be like—she was able to catch the entire country off guard 
by the moral power of her message.  
Yet she did not submit to the rhetorical traditions of the context. The fact that this 
was a convention and had traditional methods of engaging in debates did not cause 
Hamer to hesitate. The fact that her audience was predominantly white did not cause 
Hamer to become submissive. Instead, she embodied her argument and bluntly told the 
nation that the American dream had been deferred. Like Terrell, Hamer’s examples 
“were an ideal vehicle for evoking empathy” and that “each was presented in sufficient 
detail to allow the listeners to imagine themselves in such circumstance.”27 Both Terrell 
and Hamer made “an attempt to make whites understand just what it was to be Afro-
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American.” Hamer transcended all traditional rhetorical forms by appealing to higher 
values of humanity. Her appeals echoed the references to President Kennedy that were 
woven throughout the rhetoric at the 1964 convention. She appealed to the responsibility 
of the nation to protect and propagate freedom and good will for everyone. 
This moral enactment behind her rhetoric infused Hamer with symbolic power 
that differed from the rhetorical forms of the other Freedom Delegates. In the breach of 
traditional convention form, Hamer’s rhetoric also breached the vision of reality as the 
nation had previously understood it. Hamer demonstrated the “power of constituting the 
given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or 
transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world 
itself.”28 During her testimony, Hamer used the power of symbols, including herself, to 
transform the reality of her audience.  
Yet Hamer could not maintain the legitimacy of her reality, and consequently the 
legitimacy of the Freedom Party. Simons writes that “the primary rhetorical test of the 
leader—and, in directly, of the strategies he employs—is his capacity to fulfill the 
requirements of his movement by resolving or reducing rhetorical problems.”29 Hamer 
managed to reduce the gap between her reality and that of the nation, yet the Freedom 
Democrats were not seated. The moral power behind Hamer seemed to falter and fade 
away over the next four days of the convention . . . or perhaps it was never established. 
The “racial project,” as Omi and Winant would call it, of the Freedom Party was 
to challenge not only the traditional rhetorical form of the Democratic National 
Convention, but develop a rhetorical form that would represent and explain the current 
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racial dynamics in an effort to “reorganize and redistribute resources along particular 
racial lines.”30 Thus the importance of the rhetoric that was developed and employed by 
the Freedom Democrats during this convention should be seen as challenging the 
discrepancies within the national law, and in so doing, challenging the legitimacy of the 
national reality—a reality embedded with hypocrisies and propagated by the facade of a 
rhetoric of equality. The rhetorical goal of the Freedom Party was to transform reality 
through testimonies that illustrated these hypocrisies and illuminated a new vision of 
reality. But their rhetoric, no matter how much it assimilated to, toggled between, or 
transcended above traditional convention form, could not obtain and maintain the 
symbolic power needed to accomplish this goal. Perhaps there is more to their failure 
than just their rhetorical strategies. Before this is explored further, it is important to 
finish the fight. 
 The next chapter wraps up the historical account of the 1964 Democratic 
Convention. Chapter IV also wraps up the rhetorical situation, and uses key concepts 
from previous chapters to explore how shifts in heresthetic control and rhetorical 
strategy, combined with media reconstruction of the event, created a tug-of-war between 








THE FIGHT FOR REALITY 
 
Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country. 
–JFK 
 
The day after the credentials committee hearing, as the public waded through the 
murky waters of their reality, Johnson and his staff initiated strategies to calm the stirred 
waters of the country’s conscience. This chapter offers a historical account of the 
remaining four days of the convention, and traces the events that lead up to the 
compromise. The purpose of this chapter is to give a historical account of the four days 
of convention politics. More than that, however, this chapter seeks to examine how the 
rhetorical situation concluded. Specifically, this chapter explores Johnson’s response to 
the exigence, an exigence that included the symbolic power of the Freedom Party’s 
racial project, and the continued struggle over that symbolic power. This chapter also 
examines the media’s rhetorical construction of the events, and suggests that the media’s 
role, combined with Johnson’s rhetorical strategies and heresthetic control, caused the 
dissolution of the Freedom Party’s legitimacy. What follows is an account of the 
remaining four days, and the rhetorical struggle for symbolic power. 
The day after the Credentials Committee hearing, Bill Moyers wrote in his 
political news summary, “Sentiment that the upcoming convention was going to be 
placid continued to be expressed.”1 Moyers’s statement reflected a public image of the 
convention and of the Democratic Party that the White House desperately tried to 
maintain. Kotz writes, “If the Mississippi issue reached the convention floor, Johnson 
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knew the deep schism already dividing the Democratic Party would be exposed—in all 
of its bitterness—to a national television audience, as would the conflicting loyalties 
within the president himself.”2 In order to propagate the public perception of unity 
within the Democratic Party, Johnson had to counter the Freedom Party’s testimonies 
that had suggested otherwise. But he had a lot of work to do. 
Inside the convention hall, behind the probing eye of the media, all was not 
placid. The Credentials Committee was unable to reach a decision. Johnson had 
proposed a plan to seat the white-regulars, with the stipulation that they sign a loyalty 
oath to the Democratic Party, platform and presidential nominee. He offered the 
Freedom Delegates seats as honored guests and vowed to end discrimination at future 
conventions. Both the regular and the Freedom Delegates rejected this plan.3 Rauh was 
no help to Johnson. The young attorney had recruited more than enough votes to ensue a 
floor fight at the convention, and encouraged the Freedom Delegates to refuse any and 
all compromises. Kotz writes, 
The morning after the [credentials committee], an optimistic Rauh counted 
seventeen committee members who would support the Freedom Party, as well as 
ten state delegations willing to call for a vote on the convention floor. Fannie Lou 
Hamer and her fellow Freedom Democrats were now celebrities, mobbed by 
reporters and welcomed as they presented their case at various state delegation 
meetings. On the boardwalk in front of the convention center, crowds gathered at 
MFDP rallies to hear Hamer, in her strong alto voice, lead the delegates in 
singing “This Little Light of Mine.”4 
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Rauh was convinced that the testimonies had achieved enough legitimacy and power to 
redefine the reality of the Democratic National Convention, and consequently the 
political and social reality of the entire nation.  
On Sunday evening, as CORE and SNCC held an all night vigil outside the 
convention hall, the preoccupied president sat behind his desk in the White House. 
Determined to find a compromise before the issue caused chaos on the floor, he made 
phone call after phone call to his staff—Humphrey, Reuther and Mississippi Senator 
James Eastland. Senator Eastland served as a liaison between Johnson and the “regulars” 
of Mississippi. His voice moved across the line precariously, wavering between fits of 
frustration and threats to periods of pleas and suggestions. Eastland and Johnson would 
exchange a number of phone calls throughout the next few days; Johnson dictating a 
loyalty oath for Mississippi Governor Johnson’s consideration, Eastland reporting that 
the Governor had told his delegates to vote however they felt. Constrained, Johnson 
order the Credentials Committee to procrastinate.  
On Monday, the credentials committee created a five-member subcommittee. 
David Lawrence designated Tom Finney (White House Staff Director), Reuther, 
Humphrey and himself to serve on the subcommittee. Mondale was appointed chairman. 
The strategy was ingenious. By taking the issue out of the media’s spotlight, Johnson 
took some of the urgency out of the rhetorical crisis. In doing so, the president regained 
some heresthetic control. The Freedom Party felt the constraint of the president’s shift in 
strategy, as they needed to gain the media’s attention—a difficult task when they were 
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no longer involved with the convention proceedings. But Johnson had only masked the 
crisis, not dispelled it.  
The media was still very much interested in the potential walk-outs of 
delegations at the convention. Claude Sitton with The New York Times wrote that the 
Alabama and Mississippi disputes “threatened” to cost support not only in those two 
states but in Arkansas and Louisiana as well. Senator Humphrey attempted damage 
control with the Democratic Party’s public image, and told an NBC-TV Audience that 
he thought they would all “have some good news” in the Mississippi dispute very soon.5 
In reality, however, the ominous threat of walkouts by southern states loomed. 
The Alabama State delegation had rejected the requirement of a loyalty oath as a 
condition to be seated 32-4. The subcommittee knew that the Mississippi regulars would 
not sign a loyalty oath. They also knew that the Freedom Democrats would not be 
satisfied with seats “as honored guests” but not as delegates. There was a meeting called 
to obtain support and compromise from the Southern states, but it too failed to reach an 
agreement.6 
Meanwhile, Humphrey sought compromise on the other side of the ring. Acting 
as liaison between the Freedom Democrats and Johnson, he began meetings with Rauh, 
Henry, Moses and other members of the Freedom Party. Convinced that his stand on 
civil rights issues would give him more weight as a mediator between the contesting 
parties, Humphrey was surprised when Hamer challenged his devotion to the racial 
issue. Ed King remembered sitting in the “smoke filled rooms” and listening to 
Humphrey talk about how his vice presidential nomination depended on his settling this 
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issue, and about all the good things he could do if he were vice president. King recalled 
an exchange between Humphrey and Hamer: 
She left in tears and Senator Humphrey was in tears as he talked about losing the 
vice presidency and all he wanted to do. . . She said, “Well Mr. Humphrey, do 
you mean to tell me that your position is more important to you than four 
hundred thousand peoples lives?”. . . Mrs. Hamer basically said if you sell your 
soul you will not be able to do any good. To Mr. Humphrey she said, “Senator 
Humphrey, I know lots of people in Mississippi who have lost their jobs for 
trying to register to vote. I had to leave the plantation in Sunflower County. Now 
if you lose this job because you help the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 
everything will be alright. God will still take care of you. But if you take it, the 
vice presidency, this way, why you will never be able to do any good for civil 
rights, for poor people, for peace, or any of those things you talk about. Senator 
Humphrey, I’m gonna pray to Jesus for you.”7 
Hamer was so emotional during her encounter with the Senator that both Humphrey and 
members of the Freedom Party, worried that she was a live wire during the dialogues, 
did not allow her to come to any further meetings with the Senator.8 
On Tuesday, as the president eclipsed his seven-lap record by running the nine 
laps around the South grounds, the subcommittee met for breakfast to discuss their 
options.9 They had outlined four possible options to resolve the Mississippi challenge. 
They could recognize the Freedom Party as the legitimate representatives of the state of 
Mississippi and seat them as the true delegates from Mississippi. Or, they could 
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recognize the all-white regulars as the legitimate representatives of the state, and allow 
the regulars to retain their seats. The subcommittee’s third option was a compromise 
proposed by Oregon representative Edith Green. The Green Compromise proposed 
seating both delegations and dividing the votes equally between delegates willing to take 
the loyalty oath.  
The final option was the subcommittee’s revision of Johnson’s early proposal. 
The subcommittee suggested that they seat the regular all-white MDPs as the legitimate 
Mississippi delegation with sixty-eight convention votes, and grant the Freedom Party 
two at-large voting delegates and sixty-six honorary, non-voting seats. In his interview, 
Humphrey stated, “We added a new recommendation to symbolize the party’s 
commitment to integration and to affirm the justice of the Freedom Democrat’s cause, 
we urged the convention to seat Aaron Henry and Ed King of the Freedom Party as one 
black and one white as delegates at large with full voting rights.”10 This final option 
passed in the subcommittee by a vote of three to two—the two southerners said no. Rauh 
found out that Mondale was about to present the compromise to a closed session of the 
Credentials Committee for consideration, and asked Mondale to delay until Rauh could 
confer with the Freedom delegates. Humphrey and Rauh scheduled a meeting to present 
the proposal to the members of the Freedom Party, including Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Bayard Rustin, Farmer and Wilkins.  
With the compromise on the table, the Freedom Party began to argue. Major civil 
rights organizations had declared the compromise a victory. They urged the Freedom 
delegates to accept it. Yet not all of the party’s members felt that the compromise was a 
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victory. In fact, the vote to accept or reject the compromise was split fifty-fifty.11 For the 
most part, it appeared as though the civil rights leaders were in favor of accepting the 
compromise whereas the sharecroppers were opposed to it. Although there is some 
debate as to whether or not Martin Luther King, Jr. was in favor of accepting the 
compromise immediately, he eventually told Ed King, “So being a Negro leader, I want 
you to take this, but if I were a Mississippi Negro, I would vote against it.”12 Henry 
explained the debate that took place behind closed doors, 
When they decide you are going to have two votes and one of them is going to 
Aaron Henry and the other one is going to Ed King—not only did they tell us we 
had two votes, they told us who they were going to. So it was just too heavy-
handed a situation and none of us could buy it. . . You see, in getting before the 
Democratic Party, any of us who are naive enough to believe that just because 
sixty-four country bumpkins from Mississippi go to Atlantic City and they let us 
in, that they open the door you know, you ain’t with it. It took. . . Roy Wilkins 
and Martin Luther King and the church clergy and the power of this nation, to 
open that door. Once the door was open I felt, still feel, and hopefully I will 
always be of this opinion, that the people that helped us open the door had a right 
to at least have something to say about what the decision ought to be. . . We were 
all opposed to the compromise, you know, two votes—no question there. But in 
terms of using the influence of the people we had used, and then that they are no 
longer useful to you now—throw them away to me it was burning your bridges 
behind you.13 
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Like Henry, Ed King and Bayard Rustin also argued that to accept the compromise was 
better than burning bridges—particular during election time. Hamer was the member 
most outspoken against the compromise. “We didn’t come all this way for no two seats, 
since all of us is tired,” she shouted.  
Constrained by the pressures of prominent civil rights people, half of the 
Freedom Party decided to protest in the hopes that they would regain public attention 
and support. They decided to occupy the seats of the regular MDP inside the convention. 
Henry recalled 
We took a position that the seats on the floor were illegally occupied. And if that 
were true, then the illegal occupants might as well be us or them. And that there 
was no greater crime committed by either and consequently conscience did not 
bother me in this area, because it had been clearly defined that the Mississippi 
delegation had refused to compromise at all and had gone home; there weren’t 
but about three of them left, and Mississippi had sixty chairs. Somebody needed 
to sit in them.14  
Michigan Professor of Economics and sergeant-at-arms at the convention, Walter 
Adams, wrote a letter detailing the events that followed his orders from Mr. Marvin 
Watson, supervising sergeant-at-arms, to remove the Freedom delegates from the seats 
that Tuesday afternoon. Adams wrote 
In response to Mr. Watson’s orders, I asked the FDP people to vacate their seats, 
but they ignored my request and instead locked arms while continuing to remain 
seated. Mr. Watson renewed his orders, whereupon I suggested to the FDP 
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members—as politely as I could—to step into the aisle so that the sergeant-at-
arms could check their credentials. When they refused, insisting (politely) that 
they had a right to sit in that section, Mr. Watson ordered me to remove them by 
force. By this time, a sizeable number of news, radio and television men had 
gathered around us, and I thought that precipitate action under the circumstances 
was both unwise and silly. I pointed out to Watson that the FDP people go limp 
on us and that we would have to drag them out under the eyes of the TV 
cameras.15 
Watson disappeared to search for orders from his superiors. When orders came, they 
were to allow the protestors already seated to remain seated, but to refuse entrance from 
any other members of their organization to join them. Robert Dunphy, deputy sergeant-
at-arms in the senate, said, “Maintain the status quo.”16  
That evening, Rhode Island Senator John Pastore delivered the convention’s key-
note address. According to Kotz, Pastore “roused the 5,200 delegates and alternates by 
declaring the Republican Party captive to “reactionaries and extremists” and calling 
Senator Goldwater’s candidacy a “Trojan horse” that would threaten American security 
and prosperity.”17 
By Wednesday, Rauh had lost his eleven and eight, and with it, his ability to 
compromise. It turned out that when push came to shove, Johnson knew how to push 
back—and whom to push. Some of the delegates believed the compromise adequately 
alleviated the problems presented by the Freedom Party, and withdrew their support. 
Many delegates, however, were blackmailed by their state governors or White House 
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aides. Mondale noted, “Johnson wanted this issue settled and he leaned hard on the 
Freedom Democrats supporters to go along with him.”18 One of those supporters was 
Verna Canson. She had been threatened that if she continued her support of the 
insurgents, her husband would lose his candidacy for a position as state judge. She 
withdrew her support. Her husband still did not receive the appointment.19  
Rauh was cornered. Reuther demanded that Rauh accept the compromise on 
behalf of the Freedom Party, but the young attorney procrastinated. Consensus meant 
everything to the Freedom delegates. He had to have the approval of his clients—most 
notably the Chairman of the Freedom Party, Henry—before he could officially make a 
decision on the offer.20 But when he learned that Mondale’s delayed meeting with the 
Credentials Committee had been rescheduled for that afternoon, he left his clients and 
attended the closed session. His only hope was to stall their decision. 
Back in a conference room, Humphrey and Reuther sat with the members of the 
Freedom Party and tried to get the group to accept the compromise. Ed King suggested 
that Hamer replace his seat in the proscribed two-seats of the compromise, to represent 
the grassroots leaders of the organization. Humphrey replied, “The president has said 
that he will not let that illiterate woman speak on the floor of the Democratic 
convention.”21  
As the men sat debating their options, Mondale stood before one hundred and ten 
Credential Committee members and presented the compromise. In 2000, former vice-
president Mondale reflected back on these events. He recalled 
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I acknowledged that our proposal didn’t go as far as either side wanted, but I said 
it recognized the problem of discrimination in the party and put in place a plan of 
action to end it. . . Joe Rauh then asked for a recess to allow him to discuss it 
with the Freedom Democrats. But at that point, Chairman Lawrence pushed for 
an immediate vote; the committee was demanding immediate action, and I’m 
sure that the White House was behind that because they were fearful that Rauh 
would use this time to stir up further pressure. In any event, after four days an 
impatient committee adopted our proposal on a voice vote. Rauh later tried to get 
signatures for a minority report but he couldn’t get enough of them to qualify 
under the rules. I then walked straight from the committee room to the largest 
news conference I had ever seen in my life, where I announced the committee 
action.  
Mondale’s appearance before the press was seen by the Freedom Democrats, who were 
still debating whether or not to accept the compromise. Mondale continued, 
To make matters worse, some of the news reports suggested that the FD 
supported the proposal. In fact they hadn’t decided what to do about it. I wish we 
had given Rauh some time to caucus with the Freedom Democrats before we 
acted. But we didn’t. Certainly the Freedom Democrats were entitled to a decent 
interval to consider our proposal. I am not proud of how this was handled, but I 
do believe the proposal itself was a good resolution of the issue.22  
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According to the nation, the Freedom Party had accepted the compromise and the 
Credentials Committee supported it. Bob Moses turned to Humphrey and yelled, “You 
cheated!”23  
That afternoon, all of the seats in Mississippi’s section were occupied. There 
were only three members from the regular delegation who had taken the loyalty pledge, 
despite death threats from Mississippians. The remainder of seats was occupied by 
sergeant-at-arms. Because they could not sit, the Freedom delegates stormed the row in 
front of the Mississippi seats and simply stood. The sergeant-at-arms reenacted the 
events from the previous day, debating how to remove the protestors and eventually, 
under the probing eye of the media, simply allowed them to remain but blocked any 
further joiners. Adams remembered the Freedom Democrats accusing him of “serving as 
an agent for the ‘closed’ society of Mississippi,” “of treating people like the 
segregationists in Mississippi,” and “of discriminating against the Freedom Democratic 
Party.” Adams replied, “I am merely serving the will of the convention.”24 Eventually, 
the protestors were offered seats by the neighboring sections like those of North Dakota 
and Michigan. 
Despite Henry’s belief that the Freedom Party should accept the compromise, he 
told reporters, “It took the personal hand of President Johnson to keep this vote from our 
group. The issue within the Administration was purely political . . . our victory on moral 
and legal grounds was overwhelming.”25 But was it a “moral and legal victory”? Was it 
even a victory? 
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Newspapers and journals fluctuated between hailing the decision as an awesome 
achievement of the Johnson administration, and conceding that it was the best option 
available. The Washington Star wrote that while they “did not agree that the compromise 
was a stroke of genius, it probably [was] the best that could be done with a very sticky 
situation.” The Washington Post said that the compromise “represents peace and honor,” 
and that “it is indeed a spectacular victory” for the Freedom Party. Slowly, the media’s 
interpretation of the Freedom Party’s case shifted, and their shared vision of a reality of 
race relations morphed back into a paternalistic portrait. This is evidenced by comments 
such as The New Republic author Murray Kempton’s who captured the public’s verdict 
in his article, “Conscience of a Convention.” He wrote, 
When Joseph Rauh finished his rebuttal, even the reporters rose and applauded. 
For just that moment, the moral claim rose supreme; as the week went on, it sank 
closer to its proper place without ever quite being restored there. . . None of the 
68 moral delegates accepted the decision at all. They had won, largely by their 
own eloquence, an extraordinary victory. An ordinary Negro is seldom granted 
something more than his legal right by any institution. They had forced 
themselves farther than anyone could have imagined upon the conscience of a 
political party. But they are very simple people. . . To them their victory was a 
defeat.”26 
Kempton’s interpretation of the rhetorical situation was shared by many. Illinois 
National Committeeman Jacob Arvey said of the compromise, “To seat the 68 regular 
Mississippi delegates takes care of the legal problem, and to seat the two Negroes takes 
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care of the emotional, I could even say, the moral problem.”27 It seems as though when 
the testimonies forced America to question itself, the compromise was the answer that 
restored reality to its original state: the rhetoric of equality once again reverberated 
across the country. 
The media’s rhetorical construction of the compromise marks an important 
moment in this rhetorical situation. As the media began to sing the shared story of 
success, the Freedom Party began to lose their symbolic power to redefine reality. While 
they had successfully disturbed the still waters of the public’s perception of race 
relations, their “racial project” could not maintain the sense of urgency and legitimacy 
needed to “reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines” in the face 
of the compromise.28 When CBS newsman Eric Sevareid said, “Like Solomon, the 
Credentials Committee decided to divide the baby. . . [the Freedom Party would be] not 
quite separate and not quite equal,” he captured the public perception that things had 
been resolved as best as they could be.29  
The media’s rhetorical reconstruction of the crisis distinguished two separate 
issues on which the public had to judge: legal and moral. For example, Gould Lincoln 
with the Washington Star wrote, “Legalistically, the advantage is all with the regular 
delegation. Emotionally and morally, the sympathies of many convention Democrats 
from North and West are the Mississippi Freedom Party group.” The New York Times 
wrote, “The compromise settlement . . . was a triumph for moral force and a credit to all 
party leaders who worked it out, despite its ill-considered rejection by both sides.”30  
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 Wednesday evening, Johnson accepted his party’s presidential nomination of 
him. By Thursday, there was a dramatic drop in public interest of the Mississippi 
challengers. The moral power established in the Freedom Democrats’ testimonies only 
three days earlier now seemed to have lost its power with the public.  
 Even still, those members of the Freedom Party who did not accept the 
compromise would not surrender the fight. Sergeant-at-arms Adams recalled, “At one 
point, about seven FDP members formed a circle in the middle of the aisle near an 
intersection and stood there silently as if in prayer. Each carried a black plaque inscribed 
with a likeness of President Kennedy and the famous ‘Ask not...’ quote from his 
Inaugural.” Adams was instructed to seal off the section, but permitted one newsperson 
at a time to conduct interviews. He wrote, “As far as I could tell, the TV cameras 
remained focused on the rostrum and, aside from the inconvenience of some aisles being 
sealed off, the demonstration caused no untoward incident.”31  
That night, Bobby Kennedy delivered a moving speech about his brother. The 
entire nation was still so consumed with emotion from the assassination of their former 
president, that when Bobby took the stage, the convention hall erupted in applause. The 
applause continued for ten minutes before the Senator even began. The harmonious 
sound interrupted virtually every line of Kennedy’s speech. No one seemed to notice the 
quotes on the plaques that the Freedom Democrats clutched tightly to their chests. 
 On Friday, Johnson stepped out of the Atlantic City convention hall to a crowd of 
people singing “Happy Birthday.” The fifty-six year old Democratic presidential 
nominee declared Humphrey his running mate and delivered “the first impromptu 
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exclusive presidential interview ever seen on national television before.”32 Everything 
seemed to have returned to traditional political convention form. 
 Beneath the pomp and circumstance, however, some news reporters detected a 
crack in reality—a crack in the Democratic Party. Despite Johnson’s attempts to guise 
the controversy, the media had seen enough to know that there was a schism in the party. 
The Chicago Tribune wrote, “The efforts of the devious and designing man in the White 
House to keep the battle of the explosive mixture at Atlantic City corked up tight failed.” 
The article continued, “The contradictions of Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Democrats 
were brought out in the open for all to see.”33 Conservative columnists Rowland Evans 
and Robert Novak added that “the underlying theme in this wholly unique Democratic 
National Convention is the vague and voiceless spirit of rebellion, rigidly suppressed by 
the strong arm of Lyndon Baines Johnson.”34  
The media’s rhetorical reconstruction of the events at the Credentials Committee 
as well as at the convention reflects an awareness that something had happened to the 
Democratic Party. There was not, however, the definite shift in the social and political 
consciousness that the “racial project” had sought. The nation’s rhetoric of equality 
resumed its role in defining reality.  
In fact, the hypocrisies of the rhetoric of equality picked up where they had left 
off; the public pronounced “fairness” and “justice” in the case of the Freedom Party. 
Shared tears did Hamer virtually no good, as in the moment when the Freedom 
Democrats rejected the compromise, even the most liberal Democrats seemed to scoff. 
New York Times liberal columnist Anthony Lewis declared that the Freedom Party 
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“could have accepted a rule that they did not altogether like, instead of slipping into 
unauthorized seats . . . They could have made a point not of their demand for total 
victory but of their loyalty to the national Democratic Party and to President Johnson.” 
Evans and Novak dispensed their distaste not just to Johnson but also to the Freedom 
Party, writing that the compromise “was far better than [the MFDP] had any right to 
expect,” and that the protestors’ actions were a direct result of the “Communist 
influence” in the civil rights movement.35 Aside from a few supporters, like Delegate 
Green of the Green Compromise, the public had returned from their deliberation of 
definitions of reality and the verdict was clear: in one swift move, the media declared 
those blacks from Mississippi as “uppity,” and the public returned to their world of 
paternalistic pandering. The Wall Street Journal summarized, “The ’64 protestors 
achieved little beyond TV publicity for their cause.”36 
The State of Mississippi, on the other hand, seemed to have never even strayed—
not even momentarily—from their original definition of reality. Mississippi Governor 
Johnson adamantly advocated the Southern way of life. He told reporters that the 
“Mississippi walkout was carefully planned and executed to embarrass the 
Administration.” 37  
Johnson won the November election with an unprecedented sixty-one percent of 
the popular vote, and on January 20, 1965, he was inaugurated as the country’s thirty-
fifth president.38 On August 6, with the support of Congress, Johnson signed into 
legislation the Voting Rights Act, which abolished literacy tests and other requirements 
designed to handicap blacks’ voter registration. Five days later, the Watts uprising 
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initiated a surge of black riots in Los Angeles, California.39 The disparity between law 
and practice continued to leave much desired.  
This chapter offered an account of the closing chapter of the rhetorical situation 
at the convention. This chapter explored the rhetorical struggle between the president 
and the Freedom Party over the four days of the convention. By integrating the media’s 
rhetorical construction of the events into the historical account, this chapter suggested 
that the media’s role, combined with Johnson’s rhetorical strategies and heresthetic 








Sometimes it’s worse to win a fight than to lose. –Billie Holiday 
 At the close of the convention, Carl Sanders called the president to complain on 
behalf of several prominent Southern leaders. He told the president that the South 
interpreted the decision to seat two-delegates-at-large from the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party as Johnson giving the Democratic Party to blacks. Sanders made it 
clear that no one in the South wanted to sit next to the “Negroes.” Johnson replied, 
What they ought to be. . . honestly between you and me, with their population 
fifty percent, they ought to be delegates of the Mississippi group. . . They are 
Democrats and by God they tried to tell the convention. . . They lock ‘em out. . .I 
think you got a good legitimate case to say that the state of Mississippi wouldn’t 
let a Negro come into their damn convention and therefore they violated the law 
and wouldn’t let ‘em vote, wouldn’t let ‘em register, intimidated them and by 
God they ought to be seated!1  
Despite his perceptive evaluation of the situation, in the end Johnson found it easiest to 
rationalize that no one would vote anyway, so it did not matter who sat where. He 
accused Sanders and the South as acting “like a dog in the manger.” “What’s the damn 
difference?” he exclaimed. The Freedom Party was not seated, and would not take any 
votes away from Mississippi or any other Southern delegation, so what did it matter that 
he had given two seats and two badges to two Americans? “It’s just a pure, symbolic, 
pussyfootin’ thing to try to keep from splitting the party like Goldwater would like to see 
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it split,” he told Sanders.2 To Johnson, this was merely a symbolic gesture, but did not 
hold any symbolic power. 
The concept of symbolic power emerged as a dominant theme during the 
rhetorical exigence. While Johnson seemed to shrug off the two at-large seats that the 
compromise gave to the Freedom delegates as purely a “symbolic pussyfootin’ thing,” 
he was well aware of the struggle for symbolic power, and engaged in this struggle 
through rhetorical acts throughout the convention.  This thesis highlighted this struggle 
for symbolic power by tracing the rhetorical situation as it evolved; the struggle became 
a tug-of-war as rhetorical strategies shifted in response to emerging constraints such as 
heresthetics, the media, and the rhetorical acts, which include the testimonies that were 
delivered, the political bargaining that went on behind the scenes and the sit-ins on the 
floor of the convention. This thesis looked at the symbolic power within the rhetorical 
strategies of the key players—from the regular Democrats to the Freedom Democrats to 
the public. By tracing the precipitation of events throughout the convention, I hoped to 
expose the historical crisis for what it really was—a debate over reality. The chapters 
offered detailed accounts of the social and political context in which this struggled 
progressed, and attempted to highlight the role of rhetoric in precipitating each event 
during the struggle. 
 In Chapter I, I introduced Omi and Winant’s concepts of racial formation and 
racial projects. Their theory of racial formation highlights the importance of language in 
creating, propagating, and redefining the reality of race and racial issues. It is with the 
creation of a racial project, or an organized group seeking to represent and explain race 
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in an effort to “reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines,” that 
reality is questioned and can be redefined.3 By engaging in the sociopolitical process, 
racial projects attempt to illuminate the hypocrisies of the rhetoric of equality, and the 
discrepancies between law and practice that this rhetoric creates. So the Freedom Party, 
organized as a racial project, attempts to redefine reality through rhetorical acts. Their 
goal is to rock the boat—to question America and in doing so get the public to question 
America. When people are confronted with the crisis of a discrepancy between what 
they thought was real and what they are being told is real, the opportunity to redefine 
reality is created. 
 But Chapter I explores the difficulty in creating this opportunity by introducing 
the concepts of rhetorical form and symbolic power. In the rhetorical crisis at the 1964 
Convention, the Freedom Party was confronted with the constraint of an established 
traditional form of political convention rhetoric—a form that was inextricably linked to 
the pervasive power of the Democratic Party. Like Bourdieu’s definition of symbolic 
power, the Democratic Party’s form held the powerful position capable of “constituting 
the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or 
transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world 
itself.”4 The Freedom Party, on the other hand, held little symbolic power. They had to 
be careful not to appear too extreme; they needed to appeal to form and power that 
supported the current reality.  
Consequently, the Freedom Party had to develop a strategic form that would 
work within the previously established rhetorical framework of the convention, for this 
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was the best way in which they could achieve the desired ends—the symbolic power 
needed to redefine national connotations of race and racism, and to redistribute social 
and political resources along racial lines. Hence Chapter II presents their rhetorical 
strategies by presenting their testimonies before the Credentials Committee. It quickly 
becomes apparent that their strategy to integrate their arguments into the established, 
traditional rhetorical form of the political convention constrained their opponents’ 
strategies: it would be easy to dismiss irrational protestors, but it was virtually 
impossible to dismiss a case presented in their own terms, particularly in front of the 
judging eye of the public. 
Yet this thesis is particularly interested in the testimony of Fannie Lou Hamer. 
As seen in Chapters II and III, it was this woman’s testimony that elicited the greatest 
response—a deluge of support from the public, and an emergency impromptu speech 
from the president. It is interesting to note Hamer’s powerful effect because, unlike the 
rest of the Freedom delegates to testify, Hamer was the farthest removed from all notions 
of traditional political convention form. Chapter III offers a close reading of Hamer’s 
testimony to unveil the effectiveness (and shortcomings) of her rhetorical strategies.  
Chapter III explores the manner in which Hamer physically defied traditional 
convention rhetorical form, employed traditional feminine rhetorical form, and 
established an evolving rhetorical form of black women.  But beyond her ability to 
toggle between rhetorical forms, Chapter III suggests that it was her ability to enact the 
Freedom Party’s case that established the symbolic power of their argument. However, 
Chapter III also comments on the fact that while Hamer managed to reduce the gap 
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between her reality and that of the nation, the Freedom Democrats were not seated. The 
moral power behind Hamer seemed to falter and fade away over the next four days of 
the convention . . . or perhaps it was never established. 
Chapter IV presents the next four days of the convention in the hopes of 
illuminating the reason that the Freedom Democrats were not seated. Once the Once 
Hamer secured symbolic power through her testimony, however, she altered the 
rhetorical situation. Like Burgess wrote, “The scene becomes what it was not before 
because of personal power to fill symbolic space with a conceived world of decision and 
action.”5 Her decisions and actions achieved her goal, if only temporarily. Her decisions 
and actions had altered reality for the public, if only by questioning it. But her decisions 
and actions also established a different exigence for Johnson. After Hamer’s testimony, 
the schism in the Democratic Party was exposed. Hamer’s testimony had placed the 
president in a precarious position: with the party’s nomination only a couple days away 
and the public’s election only a couple months away, Johnson did not want to lose the 
support of either the South or the North. 
Chapter IV traces the shifting components of the rhetorical situation over the 
next four days of the convention. In particular, this Chapter focuses on Johnson’s 
response to the shift in symbolic power. The convention that had empowered him with 
traditional political convention form had shifted to constrain his actions—with Northern 
delegates pressuring him to seat the Freedom Party, Southern delegates threatening to 
walk-out and over to Goldwater, and the presence of the press watching his every move. 
Faced with this set of constraints, Johnson developed a new rhetorical strategy to counter 
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the symbolic power gained by the Freedom Party’s rhetorical act: the development of a 
subcommittee. 
Out of the immediate eye of the public, the subcommittee could draw out a 
decision, postponing possibilities of a floor fight and focusing the media’s attention on 
the rest of the events at the convention. Johnson used heresthetics to regain symbolic 
power: by controlling what the press could see and consequently what the press had to 
focus on, Johnson was able to return to the political hardball that went on behind closed 
doors. He threatened Northern supporters and bargained with the Southern 
segregationists. Without the presence of the press, the Freedom Party began to lose the 
public’s attention, and with it, the restless waters of a reality waiting to be redefined. 
In an attempt to regain the urgency of their cause, the Freedom Party tried to 
protest by sitting in the seats of the regular Mississippi delegates on the convention floor. 
By this time, however, the press was caught up in the nomination of Johnson. In another 
heresthetic move, Johnson postponed the announcement of his running mate, creating a 
publicity stunt. The final blow came when the compromise was accepted by the 
Credentials Committee on television—without the consent let alone awareness of the 
Freedom Party. The exigence was conceived with the Freedom Party’s dramatic 
testimony before the press, and it was declared over with the Democratic Party’s 
acceptance of the compromise.   
The media’s rhetorical reconstruction of the events reflected a restored reality: 
the legal and moral issues, in the eye of the public, had been resolved. Reality returned 
to the rhetoric of equality: the South maintained their legally appointed seats (whether or 
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not they choose to sit in them), and the Freedom Democrats were given the opportunity 
to partake in the political process (whether or not they chose to do so). Chapter IV 
suggests that the role of the media, combined with Johnson’s rhetorical rebuttal—his 
ability to regain heresthetic control and sell the compromise to the public—caused the 
dissolution of the Freedom Party’s legitimacy. The Freedom delegates had lost the sense 
of urgency that propelled the public to speak up on their behalf.  
In this thesis I have attempted to illuminate the rhetorical struggle for symbolic 
power, and how this struggle developed as components of the rhetorical situation 
evolved. At the conclusion of this rhetorical situation, it seems as though the South, the 
Freedom Democrats, and the Democratic Party had been unable to redefine reality on 
their own terms. The South felt their symbolic power in the convention and in their 
states slipping away with the very presence of blacks in their political party. The 
Freedom Party felt as though they had never truly gained any power at all; after all, just 
like a plantation owner ordering about his “Negroes,” so Johnson had appeared to dictate 
the number of seats they could have and who could sit in them. And the Democratic 
Party felt their symbolic power in the political arena shrinking with the growing of the 
schism that had been seething beneath their rhetorical form of unity.  
But to return to Burgess’s point once more, when a rhetorical crisis occurs, “the 
scene becomes what it was not before because of personal power to fill symbolic space 
with a conceived world of decision and action.”6 In the aftermath of the rhetorical crisis 
of the 1964 Democratic National Convention, America became a place it had not been 
before.  
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In 1968, the Democrats seated an interracial delegation from Mississippi, and by 
1972, all state delegations had to include minorities in proportion to their population 
within that state.7 Political scholar Theodore White wrote,  
There was a historical struggle in American politics at the 1964 Convention and 
that changed America more than the advent of television. The campaign would 
have been memorable enough if only for its illustration of television’s power. But 
history that year was to put on another demonstration that far out did TV’s 
impact on American politics. . . It was considered an interim compromise but it 
was to change the entire character of American politics from then on. Somehow 
this ban on exclusion would become an insistence on inclusion.8 
This insistence on inclusion widened the growing schism within the Democratic Party. 
As Zietz noted in his article in 2004, “Nobody knew it then, but that 1964 Democratic 
National Convention would be a turning point for the party. It was Atlantic City that 
sowed the seeds of the internecine wars that tore apart the Democratic coalition four 
years later in Chicago and that have left it wounded ever since.”9  
But that is a topic for another thesis. The purpose of this thesis has been to 
contribute a rhetorical dimension to a historical case study in the hopes of offering a 
more thorough understanding of the decisions and actions of the key players at the 1964 
Democratic Convention. In the introduction, I referred to Zarefsky, who explained the 
contribution of a rhetorical scholar’s analysis of social movements on the scope of 
history. He wrote, “History has many dimensions,” and “like other phenomena, a 
historical movement can be studied from different points of view; the rhetorical historian 
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complements the efforts of other scholars who examine the political dimensions, or the 
economic, or the cultural.”10 By offering a rhetorical description to what has previously 
been analyzed predominately through a historical lens, I hope I have contributed a more 
thorough understanding of the rhetorical struggle to define (or redefine as the case may 
be) reality at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. It was the rhetorical interplay in 
the specific context of the Committee, the subsequent political bargaining behind the 
scenes during the next four days of the convention, and the emerging and evolving 
constraints as a result of this bargaining that illuminate the symbolic power and 
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